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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 




The purpose of this study was to identify where safety performance improvements 
can be made, thus establishing a foundation for further study by the company to formulate 
specific recommendations within the identified areas. The data were analyzed to determine 
whether five organizational practices and values described herein were predictors of 2009 
safety performance. Accordingly, this non-experimental comparative study examined 
differences in safety culture dimensions between plants that achieved and failed to achieve 
their 2009 safety goals. The Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Kimberly, 1984) was 
adapted to assess safety culture strengths and congruencies among plants as an extension of 
the work of Silva, Lima, and Baptista (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p. 643; 2004, p. 643) 
and Díaz-Cabrera (2007). Additionally, the underlying values, leadership types, and culture 
orientations measured through the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
were tested for the first time as predictors of accident data. Despite considerable research on 
safety climate and culture predictors of accidents in organizations (Clarke, 2006), “the 
practical significance of these factors in the prevention of accidents remains undetermined” 
(Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p.643). 
The researcher analyzed the combination of the difference and associational research 
questions. Exploration of the first research question involved analyzing the differences 
among the plants based on the results of the One-Way ANOVA for the five safety culture  
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values and practices scores. Research question two was subdivided into three questions to 
clarify the three safety performance indicators (OSHA, LTA, and severity). The results of the 
independent t-tests compared the safety culture values and practices scores across the plants 
that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 safety goals for Occupational Safety Health 
Administration (OSHA) incident rates, Lost Time Away (LTA), and severity.  
Additionally, the five safety culture values and practices scores were compared across 
geographic regions for research question three. Finally, regression was run to determine if a 
combination of the safety culture values and practices scores were predictive of 2009 OSHA, 
LTA, and severity rates. Research question five was subdivided into three questions 
regarding differences on the safety culture type. To answer the three research questions, t-
tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants’ three safety outcomes and the 
plants’ averages for each of the four safety culture types. 
Neither safety culture type scores nor safety culture values and practices scores were 
predictors of 2009 OSHA, LTA, or severity rates. The t-test results indicated large effects on 
a) company values, b) communication, c) and usage of accident information between the four 
plants that did and did not achieve 2009 LTA and severity goals, despite non-significant 
results. Differences among the plants were noted and analyzed for trends.  
           Everon Christina Chenhall 
        School of Education 
Colorado State University 
    Fort Collins, CO 80523 
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CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
DuPont, a multinational chemical corporation and nationally recognized leader in 
state-of-the-art safety interventions, asserts that "all injuries and occupational illnesses 
can be prevented” (Dupont, 1994, p. 1.2). The accepted practice is that there is no such 
thing as an "accident.” DuPont’s proactive safety management philosophy is driven by 
decades of culture emphasis on safety management, which has historically been actively 
embraced and empowered by the most senior levels of company management. In 
recognition of its widely acclaimed role in safety leadership, DuPont received the 
Excellence in Safety Training Award from Workplace HR & Safety magazine in 2007 
(DuPont, 2007). Another major chemical corporation, 3-M, places emphasis on 
standardizing and enforcing safety policies and procedures at all plants worldwide, even 
off shore plants, where government mandated safety requirements are absent or 
unenforced.  
Case studies and literature reviews (Boin & Schulman, 2008; Chang & Liang, 
2009; Findley, Smith, Gorski, & O'Neil, 2007; Robson et al., 2007) featured multiple 
organizations that have also followed suit and demonstrated a commitment to 
occupational health and safety programs and projects. During the exploratory phase of 
this study, the researcher investigated anomalies in potential predictors of safety 
performance. Some of the anomalies among organizations included clearly articulated 
methodologies for assessing safety hazards, regular audits, key safety interventions, and 
required employee and management training.  
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Policy and regulatory requirements have an acknowledged impact on safety 
performance, but excellence can only be achieved by factoring purposeful interventions 
into the organizational culture. Therefore, is it possible to connect methodologies of 
safety management to the organizational culture?  
Simon and Cistaro (2009) claimed that "safety excellence is a product not only of 
the right programs…but also of the right culture” (p.30). They proceeded to describe how 
safety is analogous to a stew with broth.  
"Safety programs are the ingredients in the stew-policies, systems and processes 
as the meat and vegetables, while the prevailing culture is the broth. If the 
ingredients are cooking in a wholesome broth-a positive safety culture of trust, 
caring, responsible leadership-everything works to its potential." (p. 30) 
Approached from the disciplines of organizational performance and change and 
occupational health and safety, this study was designed to analyze the perceptions of 
values and organizational practices related to safety culture. This exploratory study was 
performed in an undisclosed company consisting of 19 plants with similar operations 
throughout the United States and Canada. For feasibility purposes, this study included 
eight plants. This study was designed to ensure that plants within distinct regions of the 
United States were included to account for any variances that might be attributable to 
geographic location. 
This study will be based on the models representing four types of safety culture as 
follows: the Human Relations (Support), Open Systems (Innovation), Internal Processes 
(Policies), and Rational Goals (Goals). Dimensions of five organizational practices and 
values are presented in association with each of the safety culture models from the work 
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of Díaz-Cabrera, Hernández-Fernaud, and Isla-Díaz (2007) and adapted from Cameron 
and Quinn’s (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006) Competing Values Framework (Cameron 
& Quinn, 1999, 2006). The Competing Values Framework classifies the values, practices, 
and leadership styles according to culture type. Culture types are presented along a 
continuum according to whether the organization has an internal or external focus and 
whether the organization is typified by stability and control or by flexibility and 
discretion (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006).  
 
Research Problem 
The research literature discusses several approaches to developing a positive 
safety culture. However, most of the research does not classify types of positive safety 
culture according to the culture dimensions specific to both values and organizational 
practices. Despite multiple attempts to explain safety culture through competing models, 
there is limited empirical research to substantiate which company values and 
organizational safety practices have the most demonstrative impact on safety 
performance at the plant level.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to prevent workplace injuries and lost time through 
improved organizational safety practices in an undisclosed company. Accordingly, this 
study examined differences in safety culture dimensions between plants that achieved and 
failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals. The safety culture dimensions of the five 
organizational values and practices were examined in relation to Occupational Safely and 




The following overarching research questions were formulated from the work of 
Díaz-Cabrera et al. (2007), the Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 
2006), and discussions with the organization’s safety management team. Research 
questions were developed to study which combination of safety culture type scores, for 
each of the five organizational practices and values, predict safety performance by plant 
in the undisclosed organization. The criteria or dependent variables were the safety 
performance measures, whereas the predictors or independent variables were the culture 
type scores representative of the dimensions of organizational practices and values. 
1. Are there differences among the eight plants based on the average of the 
summated safety culture values and practices scores? 
2. Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 
2009 safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture 
values and practices scores?  
3. Are there differences in the averages of the summated safety culture values 
and practices scores by geographic region? 
4. How well do the individual and combined safety culture values and practices 
scores predict 2009 plant safety performance? 
5. Are there differences between the plants that achieved and plants that failed to 
achieve 2009 safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety 





Definition of Key Terms 
Authors’ Definitions of Terms Term in This Study 
Six organizational processes are the 
characteristics of the four safety culture 
models adapted from the Competing 
Values Framework. 
The term was modified and referred to the 
five organizational practices and values 
due to variations in English translation 
from Spanish and the exclusion of training 
programs.  
 
 Safety culture profile: Diaz-Cabrera’s 
(2007) Safety culture profile encompasses 
the five organizational practices and values 
and the corresponding four safety culture 
types 
 
Safety culture profile: encompasses the 
five organizational practices and values 
and the corresponding four safety culture 
types 
Recordable incident rate defined by OSHA 
Section 1904.4 as follows: “mathematical 
calculation that describes the number of 
employees per 100 full-time employees 
that have been involved in a recordable 
injury or illness” Subpart C – 
Recordkeeping Forms and Recording 
Criteria (66 FR 6123, Jan. 19, 2001) 
(OSHA, 2009). 
 
Note to Subpart C: This Subpart describes 
the work-related injuries and illnesses that 
an employer must enter into the OSHA 
records and explains the OSHA forms that 
employers must use to record work-related 
fatalities, injuries, and illnesses.                    
 
OSHA rates or OSHA recordable rates 
(See Appendix A) 
Lost time case rate is the “number of lost 
time cases per 100 full-time employees in 
any given time frame”(OSHA, 2009).            
 
LTA rates 
(See Appendix B) 
Severity rate is “a calculation that gives a 
company an average of lost days per 
recordable incident” (OSHA, 2009) 
Severity rates 






















Figure 1. Study Outline 
1) Safety Culture 
3) Culture Models (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007) are 
the culture types indicative of approach and dimensions 





2) Organizational Practices and Values 
 Leadership style of immediate 
supervisor 
 Incident and accident reporting system 
 Safety culture type of safety rules and 
procedures 
 Safe behavior promotion and 
motivational strategies 
 Organizational communication 
systems 




Limitations and Assumptions 
Senior management of the undisclosed company invited this researcher to study 
unexplained variations in safety performance indicators among the four plants classified 
as those that meet 2009 safety goals and the four that did not achieve the 2009 safety 
goals. The company selected the eight plants according to OSHA, Lost Time Away 
(LTA), and severity rates. The company provided the 2009 OSHA recordable rates, LTA, 
and severity rates. Management also considered geographic region and proprietary 
information, such as accident related costs, as the basis for inclusion of plants in this 
study.  
This study was not designed for the results to be generalized to other companies; 
however, the results likely have applications for the other plants within the company with 
homogeneous operations. A significant limitation is the lack of control the researcher had 
at each plant. For example, turnover rates and company and job tenure varied by plant 
and thus impacted this study’s validity. Additionally, the assumption was made that 
respondents were honest and provided meaningful survey responses. 
Delimitations 
The focus of this study was exclusively on the organizational practices and values 
associated with employees and managers and their values, beliefs, and perceptions. 
Furthermore, the Competing Values Framework did not display the linkage between 
organizational culture and technical systems, such as equipment design and work 
processes. Therefore, this study did not account for the gaps in the technical systems that 
might be linked to performance. However, the plants included in this study had 
essentially the same operations and processes. 
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The researcher clearly established the following parameters for this study:  
1. The organization selected for this study was based on convenience sampling in   
  selecting a single organization. 
2. The organization desires to improve safety performance.  
3. The plants have similar operations and processes.  
4. The organization has some plants that have significant variations in safety performance  
 outcomes, such as recordable incident rates and lost time.  
5. This study was limited by data that could be collected via a paper questionnaire.  
6. This study is limited to a total of eight plants that did and did not meet the company’s 
 2009 safety goals.  
7. The scope of this study is limited to production and maintenance employees and first 
 line supervisors. 
Significance of the Study 
Research has not confirmed whether the Competing Values Framework can be 
applied to diagnosing and changing safety culture (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, the results of this study could inform future studies on the predictive 
validity of the Safety Culture Values and Practices instrument by comparing safety 
culture type scores with safety performance. An understanding of which organizational 
practices and values have the most demonstrative impact on safety performance can 
enhance further research on developing the “optimal profile” and model of safety culture 




Researcher’s Perspective  
Based on my work experiences in corporate offices, small businesses, and 
universities, I have observed a variety of organizational cultures. Witnessing firsthand the 
impact of culture on behavior, I have noticed new employees’ and managers’ efforts to 
conform to acceptable workplace practices. It is difficult to adopt certain practices if they 
do not align with one’s values. I have also noticed how certain work values and beliefs 
about an organization drove certain behaviors. Some managers and employees had values 
congruent with the organization, while others did not. Although I could not directly 
measure the impact of differing values on the organization’s overall performance, I 
sensed the tension in how work was performed, how employees were managed, and how 
conflicting approaches to adopting new practices were handled. I also experienced the 
pain of working in organizations where culture change was desperately needed, but did 
not occur. 
Safety is a prime example of a critical organizational component that can be 
studied in relation to culture as evidenced by leadership and employee behaviors and 
attitudes, performance management systems, and communications. Leadership style, 
management, and employee practices are indicative of specific values. A study on safety 
permitted me to study the relationship between indicators of safety values at various 
levels of the organization and the corresponding safety performance outcomes. I am 
viewing the organization in this study as an external consultant to maximize objectivity in 
analyzing the data. I am willing to be open to whatever I may discover as I study this 
topic in greater depth. 
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CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW 
As of October 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that the total 
workforce in the United States was approximately 154 million (2009b), all of whom are 
potentially susceptible to injuries on-the-job. Even with stringent Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations covering virtually all organizations, and 
not withstanding each individual employer's commitment to safety, on-the-job deaths and 
injuries occur at alarming rates. Tragically, there were 3.7 million non-fatal injuries in 
2008 among all private industry employers. More than 50% of the 3.7 million injuries 
were serious and involved job transfers or days away from work (BLS, 2009a). 
The United States had 14,071 million employees in manufacturing during 2007, 
of which there were 5.6 total recordable cases of injuries and illnesses per 100 employees 
(BLS, 2009a). With advances in manufacturing technology including robotics, and 
considering decades long OSHA requirements and enforcement, why does the 
manufacturing sector continue to have unacceptably high incident rates according to 
OSHA standards? After all, safety performance is one of the few areas in which the 
individual organization has more management control than most any other aspect of the 
operation of the business enterprise, including sales, competitive conditions, market 
conditions, and raw material costs, to name just a few. In short, external forces do not 
dictate safety performance. 
This literature review is organized according to concepts that emanated from the 
purpose and research problem, and were derived from business related safety studies 
published in journal articles, dissertations, and meta analyses, as presented in the concept 
map below. Keyword searches and the overall methodology for locating relevant research 
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is referenced in Appendices D and E. Empirical safety studies on climate/culture and 
safety performance indicators from 1997 to 2008 were selected for the review of 
literature. The review begins with the higher order concepts (Gloeckner, 2009), namely 
organizational culture, climate, and organizational performance and proceeds to explain 
the relationship among safety culture, climate, organizational practices, and the 
prediction of safety outcome variables. 
1. Definitions and distinctions between culture and climate are presented. 
2. The research design and summary of findings for safety culture and safety 
climate studies are provided.  
3. Furthermore, this review of literature will provide a background for 
understanding the design of this study, to include the rationale for the 
selection of independent and dependent research variables.  
4. Studies included in the review were selected according to their emphasis on 


























Figure 2. Literature Review Concept Map 
Distinction Between Organizational Culture and Climate 
Schein defined organizational culture as  
“A pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration that all works well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation 
to those problems” (1992, p. 9). 
Essentially, organizational culture refers to “what employees perceive to be the 
pattern of beliefs, values, and expectations that guide behavior and practice within an 
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organization” (Gilley & Maycunich Gilley, 2003, p. 149). Further, Schein (2004) 
distinguished levels of an organization’s culture by “artifacts, espoused beliefs and 
values, and underlying assumptions” (2004, p. 46). Organizational artifacts include 
“visible structures and processes” (1992, p. 26) such as organizational charts and policies, 
which provide insight into the daily functioning of an organization. Artifacts are 
indicators of organizational beliefs and values, but may not mirror the actual values of 
individual managers.  
Several scholars differentiate climate from culture based on the level of analysis. 
As such, climate is focused on the work group or micro level of the organization, 
whereas, culture is reflective of the overall organization (Burke, 2008; Gilley & 
Maycunich Gilley, 2003; Schneider, 1985). Organizational performance and change 
models, such as Gilley and Maycunich’s (2003) Organizational System Blueprint Model, 
illustrate the relationship between climate and culture based on the micro and macro 
levels of the organization. Safety climate is one of the organizational components of 
culture that is connected directly to the mission, strategy, and organizational practices. 
Work climate is linked to managerial practices and organizational processes, including 
communications and decision-making. Ultimately, the organizational processes and 
individual and organizational performance are tied to the organization’s performance 
results. 
Climate is differentiated from culture as referenced in Table 2, in that it refers to 
employee attitudes and perceptions affecting colleagues’ “day-to-day work together on 
the job” (Burke, 2008, p. 185). According to Schein, culture is defined as “systems of 
shared meanings, assumptions, and underlying values” (Schein, 1985, as cited in 
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Schneider, 1990, p. 22). Burke also makes a distinction between climate and culture with 
regard to time in terms of short-lived perceptions and attitudes versus more long-term 
organizational attributes.  
Table 2  
Selected Definitions of Organizational Culture and Climate. 
Organizational Culture Organizational Climate 
“Culture is more background and 
defined by beliefs and values. The level of 
analysis for culture is the organization” 
(Burke, 2008, p. 184). 
“Climate is defined in terms of 
perceptions that individuals have of how 
their local work unit is managed and how 
effectively they and their day-to-day 
colleagues work together on the job. The 
level of analysis, therefore, is the group, the 
work unit. Climate is much more in the 
foreground of organizational members’ 
perceptions” (Burke, 2008, p. 185) 
“Systems of shared meanings, 
assumptions, and underlying values” 
(Schein, 1985, as cited in Schneider, 1990, 
p. 22) 
Organizational climate generally 
refers to how employees perceive their 
work environment, which influences their 
work-related attitudes and behaviors. It 
provides a frame of reference through 
which individuals make sense of 
organizational life (Joyce & Slocum, 1984, 
as cited in Ngo, Foley, & Loi, 2009, p. 
668). 
“A set of understandings or meanings 
shared by a group of people. The meanings 
are largely tacit among members, are 
clearly relevant to the particular group, and 
are distinctive to the group. Meanings are 
passed on to new group members” (Louis, 
1980, as cited in Frost, Moore, Louis, 
Lundberg, & Martin, 1985) 
Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel (2004, p. 
69) defined organizational climate as ‘‘an 
individual’s attitude concerning the 
organization, comprised of its degree of 
trust, morale, conflict, rewards equity, 
leader credibility, resistance to change, 
and scapegoating.’’  
“Any social group, to the extent that it 
is a distinctive unit, will have to some 
degree a culture differing from that of other 
groups, a somewhat different set of 
common understandings around which 
action is organized, and these differences 
will find expression in a language whose 
nuances are peculiar to that group” (Becker 
Bowen and Ostroff (2004, as cited in 
Ngo et al., 2009, p. 669) argued that a 
strong organizational climate affects how 
employees share a common interpretation 
of what behaviors are expected and 
rewarded, and hence a situation is created 
for better organizational performance. 
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Organizational Culture Organizational Climate 
& Geer, 1970, as cited in Frost et al., 1985) 
 
 
Relationship Between Organizational Culture, Organizational Practices, and 
Organizational Performance 
Research has shown that organizational performance varies according to types of 
organizational cultures based on the Competing Values Framework classification. There 
are four dominant culture types as follows: policy-oriented, goal-oriented, supportive, 
and innovative cultures. For example, Yeung, Brockbank, and Ulrich (1991) conducted a 
factor analysis of 12 questions on organizational culture related to six HR practices 
including: staffing, development, performance appraisal, reward, communication, and 
organization design. Performance was compared to that of competitors according to 15 
business activities. Further, the reliability coefficients for each of the practices were at 
least .80. There were differences in performance outcomes depending on the culture 
approach to the referenced organizational practices.  
The premise of the first hypothesis was that “organizational performance and HR 
practices vary with different organizational cultures” (Yeung et al., 1991, p. 67).  
Hypothesis 2a was that “Different Human Resource practices in organizations with 
different dominant culture types are significantly different” (p.65). The premise of 
Hypothesis 2a was that “HR practices significantly influence organizational culture” 
(p.67). The findings revealed that stronger culture scores were correlated with stronger 
organizational performance relative to competitors according to financial indicators. For 
example, the companies with a strong comprehensive culture had standard scores of 1.46 
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and scored .31 for organizational performance, whereas those with weak comprehensive 
culture scores had a -1.0 for culture strength and a -.28 score for organizational 
performance. There were significant differences in the standard scores for the HR 
practices (p<.001) (F, 25, 21, 29, 24, 27, 21) among the culture clusters including: strong, 
comprehensive culture, group-driven, hierarchy-driven, development-driven, and weak 
comprehensive culture.  
Safety culture defined 
The term “safety culture” was first used in 1986 in an International Safety 
Advisory meeting following an accident. Since then, the term has multiple meanings; 
there is not a universal definition of “safety culture” (Rao, 2007). According to 
Guldenmund (2000, 2007), safety culture has been well studied; however, researchers 
have not reached a consensus on the dimensions that constitute a safety culture. Research 
studies have shown anywhere from “2 to 19 safety culture dimensions ranging from 
management to risk awareness” (Borjesson, 2008, p. 2) and attitudes and perceptions of 
the safety climate. The commonly cited dimensions of a positive safety culture presented 
in a dissertation on predictors of work-related injuries (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & 
Bryden, 2000; McConnell, 2004) include: “commitment by management and workforce, 
leadership style and communication, individual responsibility, management 
responsibility, risk awareness and risk-taking” (McConnell, 2004, p. 14).  
Some of the common components addressed in the definitions of “safety culture” 
include the following: “safety management” (Choudry, Dongping, & Mohamed, 2007, p. 
207) “safety system” (Choudhry et al., 2007, p. 208) “safety climate” (Choudhry et al., 
2007, p. 207; Hale, 2000, p.2) “safety management system” (Hale, 2000, p. 2; Diaz-
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Cabrera, 2007, p. 1202)  “socio-technical system” (Grote & Künzler, 2000, p. 452; 
Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009)and “behavior-based safety” (Choudhry et al., 
2007, p. 208).  
Safety culture indicators are classified according to formal versus informal norms. 
The formal norms in a safety culture are characterized as written organizational safety 
policies and procedures, such as OSHA regulations, whereas the informal norms are not 
documented (Rao, 2007, p. 730). Rao contends that social networks and trust among 
employees is a critical aspect of informal norms that frequently determine whether 
employees will make safety first. Trust forms group cohesiveness and impacts 
employees’ actions regarding one’s personal safety and others’ safety regarding safe 
work practices, protective equipment, and appropriate safety interventions.  
Therefore, one can posit that even if the organization has a number of formal 
aspects of a “safety culture,” yet lacks the critical informal norms, then safety is likely 
not part of the culture.  Furthermore, a safety culture cannot be assessed exclusively 
through observable behaviors and organizational artifacts, but must also include 
perceptions of daily practices, attitudes, and beliefs. Table 1 presents selected definitions 





Table 3  
Selected Definitions of Safety Culture and Characteristics. 
Definition Reference       Characteristics of Safety Culture 
“Safety culture should not 
be something separate from – 
or in addition to – an 
organizational culture, but 
constitute an integrated part of 
this.” 
(Haukelid, 2008, p. 
416) 
Integrated part of organizational 
culture 
“Safety culture can be 
viewed as a component of 
corporate culture, which 
alludes to individual, job, and 
organizational characteristics 
that affect and influence health 
and safety.” 





 Individual features 
 Job features 
 Organizational 
characteristics 
 Affect and influence health 
and safety 
“Considering some of the 
ways in which safety social 
capital can work for an 
organization as discussed 
above, it follows logically that 
safety social capital is indeed 
very indispensable to 
organizations in order to have 
a positive safety culture.” 
(Rao, 2007, p. 732)  Social capital 
“Safety culture can be 
construed to be manifested in 
shared values and meanings, 
and in a particular 
organizational structure and 
processes, safety policies, 
strategies, goals, practices, and 
leadership styles related to 
safety management system.” 
“Safety culture is a recent, 
polemic and complex concept 
that requires considerable 
theoretical and empirical 
clarification” (Diaz-Cabrera et 
al., p. 1203). 
(Díaz-Cabrera et al., 
2007, p. 1203) 
 Shared values and meanings 







 Leadership style 
“Safety culture can be 
described as a set of beliefs, 
norms, attitudes and social 
technical practices that are 
concerned with minimizing the 
(Ahmad & Gibb, 




 Social technical practices 
 
19 
Definition Reference       Characteristics of Safety Culture 
exposure of individuals, within 
and beyond an organization, to 
conditions considered 
dangerous or injurious.”  
 
Definition of a positive 
safety culture: “A set of 
values, perceptions, attitudes 
and patterns of behavior with 
regard to safety shared by 
members of the organization; 
as well as a set of policies, 
practices and procedures 
relating to the reduction of 
employee’s exposure to 
occupational risks, 
implemented at every level of 
the organization, and reflecting 
a high level of concern and 
commitment to the prevention 
of accidents and illnesses.” 
(Fernandez-Muniz et 




 Patterns of behavior 
 Policies  
 Practices 
 Reduction in occupational 
risks 
 Commitment to prevention of 
accidents and illnesses 
 
Table 3  
Safety Climate Characteristics   
Authors Safety Climate Characteristics 




Communication and support 
- Suitability of procedures 
- Work pressure 
- Personal protection team 
- Safety norms 
- Relations 
Cooper & Philips (2004) 
 
Attitudes, risk level, 
 Importance of training 
Effects of safe behaviour on promotion 
Status of safety personnel 
Seo et al. (2004) Commitment of management 
- Support from supervisor 
- Support from coworkers 
- Employee participation 
- Level of competence 
Lu & Shang (2005) 
 
Safety of supervisor 
- Safety of job 
- Safety of coworkers 
- Safety management 
- Safety training 
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- Safety norms 
- Job pressure 
Nielsen et al. (in press) 
 
Safety leadership 
- Leadership of immediate supervisor 
- Safety instructions 
- Commitment to safety 
- Safety violations 
Evans, Glendon, & Creed 
(2007) 
 
Management commitment and 
communication 
- Safety training 
- Team and maintenance 
Note: Adapted from “Safety Climate Dimensions (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2008).   
Distinction Between Safety Culture Versus Safety Climate 
As shown in Table 1, Díaz-Cabrera, et al.(2007) assert that if a culture of safety 
exists then it is interwoven with the organizational culture, which is congruent with 
Mathis’ (2009) claim that “traditional safety” should not be separate from a “culture of 
safety” (p.22).  Safety climate is clearly a sub-component of safety culture related to 
individual and group attitudes and behaviors related to engagement in safety practices 
(Cooper, 2000; Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007). 
A positive safety culture is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions and an extension of climate to also include the overall “commitment to 
safety, values, and trust” (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2008, p. 85). According to Findley, et al. 
(2007), “safety climate describes the safety attitudes and perceptions of employees at a 
single point in time in an effort to identify system weaknesses and opportunities for 
safety improvements”(p. 876). Definitions of both culture and climate emphasize shared 
beliefs and values regarding safety. Tables 2 and 3 also reflect the overlap between the 
dimensions of safety climate and culture. 
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Relationship Between Safety Culture, Organizational Practices, and Safety 
Performance Indicators 
The research literature discusses several competing approaches to developing a 
positive safety culture through organizational practices and values (Hale, 2000; Richter & 
Koch, 2004). Given the difficulty of defining safety culture, the issue of how to examine 
safety culture remains and for this reason, a majority of the studies focus primarily on 
safety climate. Despite multiple attempts to explain safety culture through competing 
models, there is limited empirical research to substantiate which dimensions of 
organizational practices and values have the most influence on actual safety performance. 
For example, researchers such as Rundmo (2000) have studied approaches to developing 
a safety culture through safety climate measures encompassing safety attitudes, risk 
perception, and behaviors; yet, their model’s linkage to actual safety performance 
indicators is unclear (Hale, 2000). More research is needed to study other aspects of 
culture, in addition to safety climate, to determine if there is a relationship between safety 
culture and organizational performance.   
Beginning with Zohar’s (1980) studies on safety climate, this review evaluated 
the link between safety climate and safety performance. Research cites evidence to 
support the influence of safety climate on safety performance indicators (Clarke, 2006; 
Rundmo, 2000; Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Zhou, Fang, & Wang, 2008; Zohar, 1980). 
Zohar (1980), known for his extensive research on climate, predicted safety performance 
at the group level within an organization from “safety climate scores” (Findley et al., 
2007, p. 878). Zohar also showed that a comparison of “safety level and accident/incident 
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data and safety climate scales discriminated between organizations with different levels 
of safety” (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997, p. 647).  
The referenced studies suggest a relationship between safety climate and safety 
performance, yet, questions still remain regarding the best measures of safety climate. 
Policies and procedures is the second most frequently occurring scale within safety 
climate survey research (Clarke & Flitcroft, 2006). Isla Díaz and Díaz Cabrera (1997) 
interpreted the results of their safety climate and attitude study of three companies at a 
European airport suggesting that “one of the most critical areas related to safety climate 
seems to have been the company organizational policies” (p.648). The results also 
supported Schneider’s (1990) findings that “safety policies acting through the safety 
climate have an impact on the safe behavior of the workers” (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 
1997, p. 648). Safety climate accounted for 55% of the variance for the perceived safety 
climate measured according to a) safety policies and procedures, b) communication, and 
c) organizational support (DeJoy et al., 2004). 
Safety studies have measured policies and procedures that are in place in 
organizations with positive safety cultures. However, “it is practically impossible to 
develop safety rules and procedures that respond to all given situations in organizations” 
(Diaz-Cabreara et al., 2007, p. 1202). Therefore, it is important to understand which 
values undergird the safety practices of organizations known for having a positing safety 
culture because the values ultimately impact behavior, despite policies and procedures 
that are in place. 
Varonen and Markku (2002) assessed 22 safety variables associated with 
organizational practices and the work environment in eight wood-processing companies 
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in 1990 and 1993. Three factors of safety climate studied in relation to accident rates 
were a) safety activities of management and safety personnel, b) anticipation of hazards, 
and c) safety training. Their study confirmed the hypothesized relationship that higher 
scores on safety climate and accidents correlated with lower accident rates. Some of the 
company practices consisted of “organizational responsibility, workers’ safety attitudes, 
safety supervision, and company safety precautions” (p. 767). The results of the Varonen 
et al. study were also consistent with Neal and Griffin’s (2006, as cited in Hedlund et al., 
2010) research, which established the “connection between safety climate and employee 
safe working practices” (p.2).  
Silva, Lima, and Baptista (2004) established measures of safety climate according 
to the four culture orientations of the Competing Values Framework. The instrument was 
administered in 15 industries to 930 employees.  Confirmatory factor analysis revealed 
that the questions were “compatible with the four safety orientations” and that “structures 
could be applied to companies in several industries” (p.218). In addition, they examined 
differences among the newly established safety climate dimensions and low and high 
accident and severity rates in 1999. Strong correlations existed between the following 
safety-related practices and accident frequency and severity rates: a) safety as an 
organizational value, b) management safety activities, c) communication related to safety 
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Relationship Between Values and Leadership Styles Related to Safety  
Bruno and Lay (2008) outlined several theories suggesting that managers’ values 
shape their leadership styles (Covey, 1990; Tannenbaun & Schmidt, 1958). In fact, 
Fielder developed a leadership theory “based upon the argument that managers cannot be 
expected to adopt a particular leadership style if it is contrary to their value orientations” 
(1967, as cited in Bruno & Lay, 2008, p. 679). Most recently, Bruno and Lay (2008) 
conducted a non-experimental study to determine whether there was a relationship 
between executives’ personal values and leadership effectiveness and organizational 
effectiveness. Their study assessed executives’ leadership styles as the basis for 
measuring leadership effectiveness according to Hersey-Blanchard’s Leader 
Effectiveness Model (1969). Leadership styles of the executives represented two 
dimensions related to task behavior and relationship behavior and were segregated into 
“telling, selling, participating, and delegating” (Bruno & Lay, 2008, p. 681).  
The Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD) instrument 
measured leadership effectiveness according to leadership adaptability. According to the 
Hersey-Blanchard’s Leader Effectiveness Model (Hersey et al., 1969), the more 
adaptable the leadership style is, the more effective the leader. The organizational 
effectiveness indicators were: net profit, inventory turns, fixed assets turns, 
depreciation/material costs, expenses/net sales, and fixed assets/net sales. The sample 
size consisted of 400 business executives from 48 organizations in the Manaus Industrial 
Cluster; there was a strong correlation (.89) between the executives’ organizational 
effectiveness based on leadership style adaptability, and the espoused values from the 
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scores on the values balance orientation. The study suggested that the lack of leadership 
style adaptability was due to low scores in political orientation because the executives 
place little value on influencing people. 
Zohar and Luria’s (2005) Multilevel Model of Safety Climate examined the 
relationships between group and organizational level factors that have been shown to 
influence climate. “Management modes of control” were classified as “compliance, 
commitment, and participation” and further categorized as proactive, active, and 
declarative, which correspond with climate types at the organizational level. The model’s 
questionnaire emphasized supervisory practices and was designed to measure indicators 
of competing management goals such as safety and productivity. Similarly, Wu et al.’s  
(2008) safety leadership measures include “safety caring, coaching, and controlling” (p. 
309). 
Managers may claim to espouse certain values through their speech, “strategies, 
goals, and philosophies” (Schein, 2004), but those values may not align with their 
actions, which Gilley and Maycunich Gilley refer to as “managerial malpractice” (2003, 
p. 160). For example, a manager could claim that safety is his or her priority; however, 
that particular manager may not enforce the safety policies because he/she believes that 
his or her plant will close if productivity does not increase. Moreover, the manager could 
reward employees for increasing production volume on a routine basis, thus, diminishing 
the emphasis on safety. The manager referenced above has a “producer” leadership style 
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006, p. 46) characterized by a focus on motivating employees and 
getting the job done, and in this case, without considering safe working practices.  
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Underlying assumptions reflect managers’ “theory-in-use” (Schein, 2004, p. 31). 
Costco’s CEO, Jim Singegal, is a prime example of providing consistent leadership 
because his underlying assumptions are congruent with his espoused values. His 
assumption about employees is that, “if you pay people well, you get good people and 
good productivity” (Maxwell, 2007, p. 48). Indeed, Singegal pays his employees 
exceptionally well, and as a result, he has been criticized for paying his employees too 
well. Employees are “paid 42 % more than the company’s chief rival” (p. 48). In fact, 
Costco has some of “the lowest turnover rates in all of retailing” (p.48). Maxwell 
describes Senegal as a caring, servant leader who treats his employees well. Each year, he 
visits all Costco stores where he is known on a “first-name basis with everyone” (2007, 
p.48). 
Applying Competing Values Framework to Leadership and Organizational 
Practices 
Cameron and Quinn’s Competing Values Framework, the conceptual framework 
for this study, has been tested over the last 26 years. Cameron and Quinn’s (1999, 2006) 
Competing Values Framework contrasts the underlying value drivers, leadership types, 
and strategic orientation for the four types of organizational cultures. The Organizational 
Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is designed to measure underlying assumptions 
of management and the organization and thus, describe the leadership style associated 
with each culture type. For instance, leadership styles characterized as a “mentor, team 
builder, or facilitator” exemplify values related to “human development” (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006, p. 46).  
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Cameron and Quinn have also devised a Competing Values Framework of 
Leadership Behavior representing leadership styles according to the four culture models 
(Frost et al., 1985). For example, leaders that value “certainty and long time lines” will 
likely “employ a hierarchical information processing style” and will fit best in a policy 
oriented culture. Conversely, leaders that value “short time lines and low certainty” take 
on “innovator and broker roles” characterized by “risk-taking, aggressive leadership 
styles” (p. 323-324).  
Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
Díaz-Cabrera et al., adapted a model of safety culture from the Competing Values 
Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Quinn & Spreitzer 1991; Quinn & Kimberly, 
1984) to study the following five safety practices and values related to performance in 
multiple safety culture studies: a) company values, b) leadership style, c) motivation 
patterns, d) training programs, e) communication, and f) usage of accident information 
(Cox & Cox, 1991; Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2008; Glendon 
& Litherland, 2001; Guldenmund, 2007; Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997; O'Toole, 2002; 
Zohar, 1980). 
Isla Diaz and Diaz Cabrera (1997) developed a safety climate instrument as a 
precursor to the development of the Questionnaire of Organizational Safety Culture 
Values and Practices (2007). The purpose of the study was to assess the relationship 
between safety climate and accident rates in airport ground handling companies. The 
published study was administered to managers and operators at an airport fuel company, 
airport authority, and ground handling Services Company in Spain. Operators and mid-
level managers were included in the sample of 299 employees. Exploratory factor 
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analysis was conducted and revealed six factors of safety climate explaining 60.8% of the 
total variance. Company policy towards safety was the single most important dimension 
of safety climate, which accounted for 38% of the variance in safety climate. 
Organizational emphasis on productivity versus safety explained 6.4% of the variance in 
safety climate.  
The instrument measured the following dimensions of attitudes and climate: (a) 
strategy/company policy towards safety matters (b) emphasis on productivity versus 
safety (c) group attitudes towards safety (d) specific strategies for [accident] prevention 
(e) safety level perceived in the airport (f) safety level perceived on the job. A One-Way 
ANOVA was conducted to examine differences among each of the climate factors and 
the companies with varying levels of safety performance. Together, safety climate factors 
and the three types companies were significant (F=4.22, p=.001). Significant differences 
were found among the level of safety performance for the companies according to 
F(2,56) and p. <.01. Effect sizes were not presented. 
A decade later, Diaz-Cabrera, et al’s (2007) questionnaire was extended beyond 
the six attitudes and perceptions of the climate factors to measure safety culture through 
the following six organizational factors: a) company values, b) leadership style, c) 
motivation patterns, d) training programs, e) communication, and f) usage of accident 
information. The questions were designed to measure constructs that extend beyond the 
perception of the incident and accident reporting system to identify the objectives for the 
reporting system, methods for soliciting feedback, and how the feedback is used.  
1. In my company, employees only contribute information about incidents and accidents 
that are clearly observable and/or serious. 
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2. In my company, employees participate in the development of new incident and 
accident reporting systems and new work procedures. 
3. In my company, employees participate in the development of new incident and 
accident reporting systems and new work procedures. 
The above questions were adapted from the Competing Values Framework (Cameron 
& Quinn, 2006) to demonstrate how organizational practices, such as the incident and 
accident reporting system, would be approached according to the organizational culture. 
For instance, in a policy-oriented safety culture, the objective of the reporting system is 
primarily to ensure compliance with safety policies and procedures. Conversely, the 
objective of the reporting system in a supportive environment is to “increase commitment 
to safety” based on the type safety culture, types of motivation, and the underlying values 
(Diaz-Cabrera, 2007, p. 14). 
Research Design for Dissertation Study  
In regards to the presented studies and findings, this dissertation study will 
explore five independent variables consisting of organizational practices and values, and 
three dependent variables including: OSHA recordable rates, Lost Time Away (LTA), 
and severity rates serve as measures of safety performance indicators. This author noticed 
two trends among the review of the literature both from the level of analysis and the 
purpose for conducting the studies.  First, most studies were conducted at the individual 
and group levels. A common theme among the variables in safety culture research 
included employee perceptions towards safety policies and procedures rather than an 
assessment of the organization’s overall values and commitment to safety (Guldenmund, 
2000). However, an exception was the Isla Díaz and Díaz Cabrera (1997) study that 
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compared employee attitudes regarding safety by company and by management, mid-
level management, and operator positions to study variations in safety climate and 
attitudes across organizational levels (p. 646). These levels of analyses permitted the 
study of both person and situational factors by considering individual demographic data 
and job classifications exposed to varying degrees of safety risks. Employees “that 
worked on a ramp were shown to have a less positive attitude than employees who did 
not work on a ramp” (p.646). Similarly, this study will assess variations in safety culture 
approaches to five organizational practices by plant and by job classification. 
Second, the purpose of most of the reviewed safety studies was to determine 
which safety practices, such as training and safety communications correlate with a 
positive safety climate. However, few studies compared the dimensions of each practice, 
or approach to each safety practice, as a predictor of a positive safety culture. For 
example, Fernandez-Muniz, et al (2007) studied nine safety practices, such as 
communication to formulate a model of positive safety culture. Communication was 
measured in terms of whether “there was a transfer of information to employees about the 
possible risks in the workplace” (p. 631) and was shown to have a .95 regression 
coefficient with the safety management system. Yet, the study did not classify approaches 
to employee communications according to whether the discussions were personalized or 
global, or whether they were proactive or reactive responses. Therefore, it is not known 
whether a measure of the varying employee communications approaches would have 
changed the communication regression coefficient with the safety management system, 
and in turn, affected the influence on the positive safety culture model. 
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Richter and Koch’s (2004) ethnographic study recognizes three distinct safety 
cultures including: production, welfare, and master based on Ullmark’s (1986) 
metaphors, Welfare and Master. Further, their review of “case studies in Danish 
manufacturing showed that it usually is necessary to differentiate between several safety 
cultures dispersed throughout the shop floor and other parts of the manufacturing 
organization” (p.703). Similarly, this dissertation will compare the responses regarding 
the safety culture of both managers and operators among four position types by plant. In 
addition, this study will examine whether safety culture types are predictive of safety 
performance indicators. Richter and Koch’s (2004) study did not “link accident rates to 
the safety cultures discussed” (p.711).  
The reviewed empirical studies were designed from the perspective of a singular 
view of cultures. As Richter and Koch stated, “Many safety culture scholars maintain a 
unitary, integrative and monolithic approach to culture” (p.704). Yet, scholars in 
organizational culture have studied distinguishing traits and typologies of organizational 
culture such as Hofstede, McGregor, Denison, and Cameron and Quinn (Quinn & 
Spreitzer, 1991).  
Safety Culture Values and Practices Variables 
Safety performance indicators or the dependent (criterion) variables for this study 
included: OSHA recordable rates, Lost Time Away, and severity rates for the regression 
analysis and were also the independent variables for the Independent t-tests. The 
independent (attribute or predictor) variables for regression and the dependent variables 
for the Independent t-tests were: the company values, leadership style of immediate 
supervisor, usage of incident and accident information, communication, and motivation. 
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The four safety culture types were: supportive, innovative, goal-oriented, and policy-
oriented.  
Safety Outcome Variables 
This section will evaluate several measures of safety performance indicators to 
establish how the safety outcome variables for this dissertation study were selected. 
Management, engineering, and occupational health and safety research present 
conflicting views on which quantifiable safety performance measures should be used to 
gauge whether an organization has a safety culture (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007). 
“Some authors argue that the reduction in accident and incident rates provides the best 
measure of the safety culture” (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007, p. 631). However, 
employees do not always report near misses and incidents due to the accident free 
incentive based systems and therefore, incident rates are not always accurate measures of 
safety performance.  
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 mandates that private sector 
employees record “work-related injuries and illnesses” (Eisenberg & McDonald, 1988, p. 
58). The calculations are based on the assumption that employees are honest and report 
all incidents. Both OSHA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics recognize that there are 
injuries and illnesses are not reported. Incident rates are not always reported accurately 
due to limited knowledge regarding proper procedures, as an example (Eisenberg & 
McDonald, 1988). Additionally, work-related illnesses can be difficult to trace to specific 
working conditions over a period of time and therefore are not reported. 
OSHA classifies safety performance indicators as leading or lagging indicators of 
safety performance in that leading indicators are a proactive measure of safety behaviors, 
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which reflect employee participation in worksite, task, and hazard analyses. Lagging 
indicators are reactive measures indicating number of incidents, but are federally 
mandated indicators of safety performance. OSHA recordables are based on standard 
calculations for comparisons across industries as noted in Appendices A, B, and C. 
However, these are not intended to be the sole measures for evaluating safety 
performance.  For these reasons, this dissertation study will utilize three different 
measures of lagging indicators: OSHA, LTA, and severity rates. 
Choudry, Dongping, and Mohamed (2007) developed a model of safety culture 
for the construction industry. The outcome variables were generalized as “increase in safe 
behaviors and reduction in incident rates” (p. 210) Such a model is fit for an organization 
with a behavioral based safety management system to ensure clear definitions of safe and 
unsafe behavior based on policies and procedures, risk assessments, “checklists and 
group discussions” (p. 209).  
It has not been determined whether the referenced independent variables can be 
predictors of OSHA safety performance. Thus, the sampling procedures will be 
conducted similarly to Holland’s (1990) dissertation  in which he selected the five UPS 
teams with the highest and lowest Days Away Restricted Transfer (DART) rates. 
Few studies investigated which variables contributed to a specific type of safety 
culture as Díaz-Cabrera, et al. (2007) applied the policy-oriented, goal-oriented, 
supportive, and innovative organizational culture types (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006) 
to safety culture. Therefore, the independent variables in this dissertation study will 
extend beyond policies and procedures to also include five organizational practices and 
values. The review of literature highlighted the significant components of a safety culture 
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including: leadership style of the immediate supervisor, incident and accident reporting 
systems, communications systems, safe behavior motivation and promotion. Thus, this 
study will apply an instrument based on an organizational culture typology to investigate 
the missing link safety culture types in relation to OSHA, LTA, and severity rates as 






CHAPTER THREE - METHODS 
This section will discuss the proposed methodology to address the research questions in 
regards to the problem as follows: a.) Description of sites and participants, b.) Rationale for data 
collection procedures based on methodology choice, c.) Discussion of instrumentation, including 
scale of measurement, and d.) Presentation of research questions and corresponding analysis. 
The purpose of this study was to prevent workplace injuries and to save lives through 
improved organizational safety practices. Diaz Cabrera et al., (2007) identified the following five 
values and organizational practices as key measures of safety culture: a) company values 
regarding incident and accident reporting and safety promotion, b) leadership style, c) 
communication, d) motivation, and e) usage of accident information. This study was designed to 
evaluate these five factors according to their ability to predict safety performance.  
Despite multiple attempts to explain safety culture through competing models, there is 
limited empirical research to substantiate which dimensions of organizational practices and 
values have the most influence on actual safety performance. Therefore, it is important to 
administer a diagnostic instrument, based on four culture models, to determine if the proposed 
safety culture types for certain organizational practices and values are predictive of 2009 safety 
performance. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Quinn and Spreitzer (1991) reference the debate over qualitative versus quantitative 
methodologies for studying organizational culture. Studies utilizing qualitative research have 
been used to understand and describe cultures. Yet, one of the limitations of using qualitative 
research methods has been the inability to compare culture dimensions across organizations. 
Given that the purpose of this study is to promote changes in safety practices based on the safety 
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performance indicators for several plants within the company, a comparison of the dimensions of 
the organizational practices and the corresponding outcomes is needed.  
 
Theoretical Frame and Grounding of Proposed Methodology 
This study was designed from the postpositivist paradigm. The researcher adheres to the 
belief that phenomena regarding safety perceptions, attitudes, behavior, and safety performance 
indicators can be best explained as “causal relationships” (Egon G. Guba, 1990; Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000). Values influence attitudes and behaviors, which in turn affect safety 
performance. Hence, the knowledge about company values and safety culture in this study was 
gained through an investigation of differences in safety practice scores representative of types of 
safety culture and the corresponding 2009 safety performance indicators. The difference 
questions determined whether specific safety practices and the classification of safety culture 
types discriminated plants according to their OSHA recordable rates, LTA, and severity rates. 
According to Guba, Lincoln, and Denzin, (2000), the ontological assumptions of 
postpositivism is that there is a “real reality,” but it is only imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehendible” (p. 193). Further, this study was designed to make “probabilistic statements of 
association” (Carlile & Christensen, 2005, p. 3) of 2009 OSHA recordable rates, LTA, and 
severity rates for the company based on the sample of the plants that achieved and failed to 
achieve the 2009 target rates for the three key indicators of safety performance. The 
epistemological assumptions of the postpositivist paradigm outlined in the data collection section 
include: “critical intersubjective verifiability across heterogeneous perspectives” (Cook, 1983, 
pp. 83-84) across plants regarding organizational safety culture. Inclusion of both management 
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and employees across plants with the highest and lowest safety performance increase the 
likelihood that the findings reflect reality than if only one subgroup was sampled. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Due to a lack of empirical research distinguishing between types of safety cultures and 
the corresponding outcomes, the researcher selected a conceptual framework consisting of an 
integration of several culture models. Research shows that certain organizational practices shape 
the organizational culture (Cox & Cox, 1991; Coyle et al., 1995; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; 
Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997; O'Toole, 2002; Zohar, 1980). Further, Diaz-Cabrera has 
identified five organizational practices shown to be significant in the safety culture research 
(2007). The study is grounded in Cameron and Quinn’s (2006) Competing Values Framework 
consisting of four culture models, derived from empirical studies on organizational effectiveness. 
The Competing Values Framework “can be useful in organizational analysis, in the analysis of 
organizational change, and in the guidance of practitioners in the execution of organizational 
development interventions” (p. 116).  
Models with emphasis on culture congruency such as Nadler and Tushman’s Diagnosis 
of Organizational Behavior (1980) and Burke-Litwin’s Model of Organizational Performance 
and Change (2008) provide support for the study’s theoretical underpinning. The conceptual 
framework provides the structure of the study and explains the development of the Safety Culture 
Values and Practices diagnostic instrument to assess the current state (Robinson & Robinson, 
1995) of the organization’s safety culture.  
The Competing Values Framework, (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006) reflective of 
contradictory models of organizational effectiveness, contrasts the underlying value, leadership 
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styles, and culture orientations for four types of organizational cultures, which have been adapted 
to examine safety culture. The organizational effectiveness models constituting four safety 
culture types are presented as follows: supportive (Human Relations Model), innovative (Open 
Systems model), policy-oriented (Internal Process Model), and goal-oriented cultures (Rational 
Goals Model). Each model hinges upon management and organization development theory such 
as McGregor’s Theory X and Y, Maslow’s Hierarchy, and Open Systems Theory (Mirvis, 1988, 
1990, as cited in Denison & Spreitzer, 1991). Culture types are presented along a continuum 
according to whether the organization has an internal or external focus and whether the 
organization is typified by stability or control (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, 2006).  
A supportive safety culture is typified by employee involvement, team building, and 
collaboration in promoting organizational commitment to safety. Examples of employee 
development might include the identification of training needs based on the results of the 
incident and accident reporting systems and/or individual feedback. An innovative safety culture 
is flexible and is characterized by changes made in job design, rewards systems, and work 
procedures to improve safety based on employee feedback and incident and accident reporting. A 
goal-oriented safety culture has clearly defined safety goals and expectations and corresponding 
rewards. On the other hand, a policy-oriented culture focuses on the evaluation of safety 
performance and the consequences of failure to comply with established practices and 
procedures. The researcher applied the framework to examine the variations in safety 
performance indicators to prevent work-related injuries and lost time. The researcher used 
regression to determine if the characteristics of the safety culture of each plant, indicated by the 
results of this instrument, could predict variations in safety performance.  
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A strength of this conceptual framework is that it could use be used to pinpoint areas of 
needed change after analyzing the results of the safety profile (Diaz-Cabrera, et al., 2007). Safety 
culture type profiles generated from the assessments in this study (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007) 
Cameron and Quinn’s (2006) Competing Values Framework can be applied to understand the 
components of a safety culture and identify culture gaps by plant. 
The organizational practices presented in the second box of Figure 1 include: company 
values (related to incident reporting and safety promotion), motivation, communication, 
leadership style of immediate supervisor, and usage of incident and accident information (Díaz-
Cabrera et al., 2007). The Competing Values Framework classifies the values, practices, and 
leadership styles according to culture type. Culture types are presented along a continuum 
according to whether the organization has an internal or external focus and whether the 
organization is typified by stability and control or by flexibility and discretion (Cameron & 
Quinn, 1999, 2006). Díaz-Cabrera classifies the values, practices, and leadership styles according 
























Figure 3. Safety culture models (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). Adapted from Diagnosing and changing organizational 
culture: Based on the competing values framework by Cameron, K. S., & Quinn, R. E. Copyright 1999 and 
2006 by Addison Wesley Josey-Bass. 
1) Safety performance indicators by 
Plant: OSHA Recordables, Lost 
Time, and Severity Rates 
2) Organizational Practices and Values related to safety based on 
product and maintenance personnel and first line supervisors’ perceptions by 
plant: 
 Company Values (related to incident reporting and safety promotion) 
 Motivation  
 Communication 
 Leadership style of immediate supervisor 
 Usage of Incident and accident Information 
3) Safety Culture Models are the types of safety culture indicative of approach and 
characteristics for the above practices by plant 
 
1. Supportive (Human Relations Model) 
2. Innovative (Open Systems Model) 
3. Policy-Oriented (Internal Process Model) 





Site and Participants 
Physical Setting 
The researcher included in the study a total of eight plants, four of which achieved and 
four of which failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals based on three key safety performance 
indicators: OSHA, LTA, and severity rates. If the safety culture type was a true predictor of 
performance, then it should have influenced safety performance of both groups. 
Participants 
The survey participants included those job classifications with the greatest safety 
exposure in the performance of their job responsibilities, as well as production and supervisory 
personnel who contribute to the daily formation of the safety culture within the organization. 
Those job classifications included the front line supervisors and hourly employees within four 
confidential job classifications. Each of the survey participants contributes to the formation of a 
safety culture in manner that was identified through the results of the questionnaire. 
The target or theoretical population (Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2009) included all 
operations management and personnel within the entire organization at multi-state plants. The 
accessible population for this study consisted of all operations management and personnel at 19 
plants. The selected sample consisted of production and maintenance personnel and first line 
supervisors at eight plants. The standard error computed based on the company size and 
sampling procedures was 2.78%. 
Data Collection 
According to Guba (1990, p. 192), the goodness criteria, based on the post-positivist 
paradigm, describe how this study was conducted to maximize objectivity and determine truth 
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about reality. Data collection strategies that ensured objectivity in this study consisted of: a) 
measurable, objective indicators of safety performance, b) perspectives from several job 
classifications from eight plants, c) anonymity of employee responses, d) confidentiality of data, 
and d) inclusion of both front line supervisors and hourly employees in this study. 
The researcher in this study adheres to the beliefs that there is a reality and a perception 
of reality. The researcher recognizes that data collected in this study are not based on direct 
observations of behavior and thus, the self-reported data serves as “circumstantial evidence” 
(Phillips & Burbules, 2000, p. 31) that certain types of safety cultures exist. Furthermore, the 
data do not necessarily reflect actual reality.  
The researcher reviewed Fowler’s (2002) recommendations on data collection methods, 
with priority given to the methods conducive to sampling eight plants. Management permitted 
data collection during business hours. However, due to the size of multiple plants, costs and time 
prohibited any interviewer-administered methods. On the other hand, self-administered methods 
permitted respondents to participate in a “convenient” (p.61) and cost effective manner for the 
organization, and likely maximize response rates. 
Procedure 
This study consisted of a two level Hierarchical Linear Modeling design to ensure that 
the individual responses to the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices (level 1) 
could explain any variability in the plant safety performance indicators (level 2).  Hence, the 
results of the questionnaire were aggregated at the plant level, the level of analysis for this 






Each plant designated a proctor to administer the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values 
and Practices during the month of February 2010. During step Ia, the company identified a total 
of eight plants, some of which achieved and failed to achieve the 2009 safety target rates for each 
of the three safety performance indicators: OSHA, LTA, and severity rates. The plants were also 
selected on the basis of geographical location and safety expenditure data, not provided to the 
researcher. The company discussed unexplained variations in safety outcomes among the eight 
plants and the desire to assess the safety culture at each of the plants using the modified 
dissertation instrument. 
Step IIa. 
During step IIa, the researcher reviewed several instruments of safety culture. After 
working with safety and human resources managers at the company to determine the dimensions 
to be assessed, the researcher decided to administer the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values 
and Practices (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). The exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 
modified dissertation instrument and compared to the EFA of the original, validated dissertation 
instrument. A discussion of the EFA will follow in the instrumentation section. 
Step II b. 
Step II b complied with data collection and analysis procedures as outlined by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for human subjects protection. (See Appendix E). This study 
design ensured that the employer could not connect any participant’s names to their perceptions. 
The designated proctors administered the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
at each of the eight plants and then collected the questionnaires in an envelope, which was sealed 
to maintain total anonymity. Each employee participated in this research voluntarily and was 
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instructed not to write his or her name on the survey. Confidentiality of the participants’ 
responses was maintained throughout the research project and individual responses were not and 
will not be released to the company.   
Participants could withdraw their consent and stop participation at any time without 
consequences. Further, the demographic questions were optional. Completed questionnaires were 
sent directly to Evie Chenhall at Colorado State University for analysis immediately upon 
completion. Graduate Research Assistants inputted data into the Statistics 18 software. 
Step III. 
During step III, the researcher analyzed the combination of the difference and 
associational research questions. Exploration of the first research question involved analyzing the 
differences among the plants based on the results of the One-Way ANOVA for the five safety 
culture value and practices scores. Thereafter, research question two was subdivided into three 
questions based on plant classification of whether their three 2009 safety goals were achieved. 
The results of the independent t-tests were to compare the safety culture values and practices 
scores across the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 safety goals for OSHA, LTA, 
and severity.  
Additionally, the five safety culture values and practices scores were compared across 
geographic region for research question three. Finally, regression was run to determine if a 
combination of the safety culture values and practices scores were predictive of 2009 OSHA, 
LTA, and severity rates. Research question five was subdivided into three questions regarding 
differences on the safety culture type. To answer the three research questions, t-tests were 
conducted to examine differences among the plants’ three safety outcomes and the plants’ 
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averages for each of the four safety culture types. Diaz-Cabrera et al. indicated which questions 
corresponded with each of the four safety culture types. 
Differences among the plants were noted and analyzed for trends. The scores for each 
dimension were compared across locations as displayed in the discussion section, Table 22. 
Second, the locations were classified according to whether they achieved or failed to achieve 
2009 safety goals for the three performance indicators; the results of the questionnaire were 
compared. The company described the desired safety culture as that of both goal and policy 
oriented. Anomalies between plant safety ratings and questionnaire results were detected and 
described in the discussion section. 

















Figure 4. Dissertation Study Procedure 
Instrumentation 
The instrument was designed to develop a visual representation of an organizational 
safety culture profile for the five organizational values and practices. (See Appendices F, G, and 
H). The instrument was comprised of 35 questions and and additional six demographics 
questions.  The results revealed whether each plant has a dominant safety culture type and 
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identified possible gaps. A comparison was made between Diaz-Cabrera’s six indicators of 
safety culture among the eight plants.  
Reliability 
Cronbach’s Alphas and item factor correlations were used to measure the reliability of 
the hypothesized factors for this study based on the work of Diaz Cabrera et al. (2007). Table 4 
presents the inter-factor correlation matrix among the five factors: company values, leadership 
style, motivation, communication, and usage of accident information. The highest correlation is 
between the company values factor and the usage of accident information factor. 
Table 4 
 







The Cronbach’s Alphas for each of the scales were at least .839 and above, which is 
considered to be a high level of reliability as presented in Table 5 (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & 
Barrett, 2007). Diaz Cabrera (2007) used Cronbach’s Alpha to measure the internal consistency 
reliability of the original instrument in Spanish and English to ensure the proper grouping of 








Motivation Comm. Usage of Accident 
Information 
Company Values 1.000 .612 .739 .765 .769 
Leadership Style .612 1.000 .675 .622 .561 
Motivation .739 .675 1.000 .655 .614 
Communication .765 .622 .655 1.000 .644 
Usage of Accident 
Information 












Because the instrument was originally written in Spanish, the researcher modified it at the 
request of the company so that employees at the undisclosed company could understand each of 
the statements. Field tests as described in the data collection procedures were conducted for 
validity and reliability purposes to ensure question clarity specific to the population. Several 
seasoned managers in safety and human resources within the company and the industry reviewed 
the questions as content experts to verify the appropriateness of the questions for measuring 
safety culture.  
Eleven questions were eliminated and others reworded due to low factor loadings and to the 
complex nature of questions with multiple constructs.   
The following presents one question that was eliminated:  
1. Question 30 on the original instrument: “Defines, plans, coordinates aim; 
motivates subordinates to achieve aims; acknowledges achievement.”  
The following questions were reworded:  








Usage of Accident Information .839
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procedures” rather than “values rules fulfillment.” 
3. Question 17 was restated as "follow" rather than “observe” so that it is clear that the 
question is about abiding by safety policies and procedures.  
4. Question 39: was reworded as “Department provides clear performance expectations 
through explaining policies and procedures.” Originally, it was worded as, “The 
department cares about satisfaction with performance criteria, for example: clarity of 
policies and procedures  
5. Question 40 was reworded as “Department provides well-defined work goals rather 
than “the Department cares about satisfaction with work goals, for example: goals are 
well-defined.” 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 Exploratory Factor analysis (EFA) was utilized to examine the dimensions of safety culture 
as measured by the Questionnaire of Safety culture values and practices (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 
2007). Considering that the questionnaire was validated in European industries, the researcher 
partnered with human resource and safety managers in this undisclosed company in the U.S. to 
modify items using language specific to the participants in this study. Additionally, EFA was 
requisite for determining the measurement validity of the instrument given industry and sample 
size differences between the original validation study (n=299) and this dissertation study (n= 
1,291). The researcher compared 32 items from the original validated instrument with the 
subsequent 24 items from the EFA of the modified dissertation instrument. 
The component factor analysis method chosen for this study was principal component 
analysis because the instrument was recently validated in 2007 and has not been used in other 
studies (Suhr, 2003). The researcher applied this instrument to a larger sample to determine if the 
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items would be grouped according to the same factors as the validated instrument (Marcoulides, 
1998). The researcher considered both contextual and statistical factors. The EFA resulted in five 
factors, the same number as the original validated instrument contained after the training 
programs factor was eliminated. 
 The following tests and standards guided the factor analysis method for this study. To 
examine the appropriateness of the factor structure, the Principal Components Analysis with 
varimax rotation was conducted in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) on 24 
items and resulted in five factors with an eigenvalue of greater than one (determinant= 1.09 E-
009; KMO=  .968; Bartlett= χ2(231)=25795.222, p=.01). Table 6 displays the Rotated 
Component Matrix. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was conducted. In factor 
selection, Kaiser’s criterion or the eigenvalue rule (of 1.0 or greater) and the scree plot test were 
used. Finally, the number of variables representing each common factor required a minimum of 











1 2 3 4 5
Company Values (Q4) .743 .279 .206 .140 .207
Company Values (Q5) .779 .219 .198 .215 .195
Company Values (Q6) .751 .219 .183 .274 .231
Company Values (Q7) .732 .244 .197 .237 .259
Company Values  (Q16) .543 .436 .170 .351 .149
Company Values  (Q17) .518 .480 .174 .388 .151
Company Values  (Q18) .539 .471 .204 .389 .175
Company Values (Q19) .496 .539 .201 .316 .175
Usage of Accident Info (Q8) .606 .240 .199 .223 .447
Usage of Accident Info (Q9) .329 .187 .128 .222 .731
Usage of Accident Info (Q10) .206 .206 .171 .077 .799
Usage of Accident Info (Q11) .381 .266 .253 .244 .546
Communication (Q20) .372 .666 .269 .228 .144
Communication (Q21) .221 .778 .230 .170 .181
Communication (Q22) .249 .740 .238 .191 .198
Communication (Q23) .226 .692 .235 .187 .210
Leadership Style (Q24) .232 .268 .764 .223 .117
Leadership Style (Q25) .217 .209 .831 .261 .156
Leadership Style (Q26) .155 .217 .833 .223 .191
Leadership Style(Q27) .203 .234 .809 .285 .131
Motivation Patterns (Q28) .347 .253 .299 .671 .107
Motivation Patterns (Q29) .284 .190 .272 .787 .134
Motivation Patterns (Q30) .257 .292 .318 .707 .195
Motivation Patterns (Q31) .221 .215 .288 .763 .194
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 





Table 7 shows the factor loadings, the percentage of total variance explained by factors, 
the internal consistency of factors, and the corrected item-total correlations. Appendix I presents 
a comparison of the exploratory factor analysis for the original validated instrument and the 
modified dissertation instrument according to the variance explained by each factor, factor 
loadings, Cronbach’s Alpha, and corrected item total correlations. 
Table 7 
Factor Loadings, Total Variance Explained by Factors, Reliability, and Corrected Item Total 
Correlations 








Factor 1: Company Values (20.021%)  0.940  
(Q4) Values employee compliance with safety policies and 
procedures 
0.743  0.766 
(Q5) Values honesty of all employees in collecting info 
about incidents and accidents 
0.779  0.785 
(Q6) Values collaboration in goals achievement 0.751  0.795 
(Q7) Values initiative in indentifying new solutions to 
improve safety 
0.732  0.790 
(Q16)Values participation in safety promotion 0.543  0.772 
(Q17) Values employees that follow safety policies and 
procedures to promote safety 
0.518  0.792 
(Q18) Values the contribution of creative ideas to improve 
safety 
0.539  0.813 
(Q19) Values goals achievement 0.496  0.779 
Factor 2: Leadership Styles (16.233%)  0.934  
(Q24) Shows the safe way to perform my job duties  0.750  0.793 
(Q25) Analyzes unsafe behavior to determine the cause 0.820  0.880 
(Q26) Warns about possible penalties when I perform my job 
in an unsafe manner 
0.830  0.853 
(Q27) Discusses most appropriate solution to prevent unsafe 
behavior 



















Factor 3: Motivation Patterns (15.221%) 0.911 
(Q28) Department encourages teamwork and cooperation 
between employees and managers 
0.610  0.770 
(Q29) Department cares about employees' job satisfaction 0.720  0.824 
(Q30) Department provides clear performance expectations 
through explaining policies and procedures 
0.650  0.810 
(Q31) Department provides well-defined goals 0.800  0.800 
(Q32) Work goals are specific, achievable, and realistic  0.790  0.730 
(Q33) Variety in job duties 0.470  0.570 
(Q34) Satisfied with the cooperation between employees and 
managers in my work group 
0.660  0.770 
(Q35) Satisfied with my performance expectations 0.670  0.750 
Factor 4: Communication (14.329%)  0.884  
(Q20) Communication among employees and supervisors 
about safety 
0.600  0.750 
(Q21) Communication of safety goals 0.680  0.690 
(Q22) Formal communication of safety policies and 
procedures 
0.650  0.700 
(Q23) Usually communication among employees to identify 





Factor 5: Usage of Accident Information (9.627%)  0.839  
(Q8) Changes in work procedures based on employee 
solutions to improve safety 
0.447  0.740 
(Q9) Revision of work goals 0.731  0.630 
(Q10) Information about consequences of  breaking safety 
policies and procedures 
0.799  0.530 
(Q11) Identification of training needs 0.546  0.700 
(Q26)Moved to leadership factor 2: The immediate 
supervisor warns about possible penalties 





Gliner and Morgan (2009) outline the criteria for internal validity of the study design. Employees 
at each plant were not randomly selected to participate; however, employees from the same 
divisions and job classifications were sampled at each plant so that demographic comparisons 
could be made. Employees that voluntarily completed the demographic section indicated their 
job and company tenure as to account for differences in participant dimensions. Therefore, the 
researcher rated the equivalence of groups as medium. Figure 5 presents the sampling plan and 
sampling design. As a non-experimental study, the control of extraneous experiences and 
environmental variables was low given the researcher’s lack of control over each plant’s safety 
practices and interventions.  The researcher controlled for regional culture differences through 
inclusion of plants from each of the geographic regions. All of the plants have relatively 
homogeneous manufacturing processes. 
External Validity 
The sampling plan and design are presented in Table 8 showing the frequency and 
percentages of the participants in the specified positions related to safety.  The adequacy of the 
sampling method was low because this study did not include a randomized sample of participants 
in the organization despite a 61.21% response rate (Gliner et al., 2009). Furthermore, the results 
of this study cannot be generalized outside the organization. The ecological validity was rated as 




Figure 5. Sampling Design of the selected and actual sample in this study. There were 174 
employees that did not indicate their position. 
 
Table 8 




Total Employees by Plant  
in Safety-Related Positions 
a
 
1 169 340 49.71% 
2 79 146 54.12% 
3 307 360 85.28% 
4 189 304 62.17% 
5 296 390 75.90% 
6 74 123 60.16% 






Total Employees by Plant  
in Safety-Related Positions 
a
 
8 73 215 33.95% 
Total 1291 2109 61.21% 
a 
4 specified job classifications 
Note. There were 174 employees that did not indicate their position. 
 
Measures 
The instrument was designed to assess the following: “company values, safety standard 
procedures and policies, motivation, organizational communications system, and leadership 
style” (Díaz-Cabrera, 2007, p. 1207). Cameron and Quinn’s Competing Values Framework 
(2006) applied to safety “reflect” four culture types including: support, innovation, goals, and 
policies (Diaz-Cabrera et al., p. 1204). The Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
was developed to measure four safety culture types based on five safety-related organizational 
practices. 
The Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices, referenced in Appendices F, 
G, and H consisted of four sections and is based on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
Disagree to Agree. Each item has a Likert response scale of 7 points to reflect the degree of 
agreement, satisfaction, and frequency of each. The first section presents a brief description of 
the project and specific instructions on how to complete the questionnaire. The second section 
contains questions pertaining to company information and job specific questions. The third 
section is comprised of 35 items about the organizational values, leadership style, motivational 
patterns, communication, safe behavior promotion, use of information about incidents and 
accidents, and motivation patterns questions. Demographic data consisting of employee tenure 
and job classification were included. 
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Below is a description of each dimension of the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values 
and Practices instrument. 
  Dimension 1: Company Values “Reflects the perceptions of employees about those 
aspects specifically related to safety management the company considers to be 
relevant. These aspects are related to the incident and accident reporting system and 
the safety promotion strategies. 
 Dimension 2: Leadership Style “Reflects the perceptions of employees about the 
behavioral style of the immediate supervisor including, whether the immediate 
supervisor “shows how to perform job duties safely when employees act in an unsafe 
manner; analyzes the unsafe behavior to determine the cause; corrects and reminds 
employees of possible penalties; discusses with employees the most appropriate 
solution to prevent the unsafe behavior in the future.” 
 Dimension 3:Motivation patterns “Reflects the perceptions of employees concerning 
the degree to which the company is concerned about their employees’ satisfaction 
with different aspects of their job, for example: job satisfaction, satisfaction with the 
work team, with the performance criteria, and work goals” 
 Dimension 4: Communication “Reflects the perceptions of workers concerning the 
type of safety information provided for workers from the upper levels. For example: 
formal communication about safety rules and procedures, and safety aims.”  
 Dimension 5:Usage of accident information “Reflects the perceptions of workers 
concerning the degree and type of usage of incident and accident information by the 
company, i.e., informing about safety rules and procedures fulfillment, detecting 
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A total of 1,117 employees responded to the second demographics question.  Of that 
total, 67.6% were hourly employees while 27.1% were first line supervisors and 20.9% reported 
other (n=174 missing). Approximately 36.7% of the total 1,096 respondents for question three 
have worked for the company 20 years or more, and 19.3% have worked for the company 
between five to ten years (n=195 missing) as shown in Figure 6. The majority of the 1,173 
respondents who answered question five work 12-hour shifts (53.9%) as shown in Figure 7. A 
total of 1,144 respondents answered question 6, of which 58.7% work rotating shifts.  
The following questions provide the frequency of responses for questions that were not 
included in the analysis of the scale, but provided insightful information in the interpretation of 
the scale scores. The following received the most “Strongly Agree” responses.  
Question 2: “My co-workers and I report incident and accidents, even if it interferes with 
achieving work goals.” (388 responses) 
 Question 4: “I feel that name of company values employee compliance with safety 
policies and procedures.” (481 responses) 
 Question 28: “My department encourages teamwork and cooperation between employees 
and managers.” (290 responses) 












Figure 6. Company tenure of survey participants is shown. There were 195 employees 














Question 1: “My co-workers and I report only serious incidents and accidents, not the less serious incidents and accidents.”  
Table 9 














Agree Strongly Agree  
 1 47 46 11 22 15 20 8 169
2 23 20 8 3 7 16 2 79
3 114 60 29 13 26 36 28 306
4 29 32 19 17 29 49 13 188
5 87 75 25 20 39 37 13 296
6 22 13 2 10 3 12 11 73
7 30 13 9 10 14 23 5 104
8 26 22 2 3 8 10 2 73





Intentions for Answering Research Questions 
Research Questions Statistical 
Analyses 
Rationale for Statistic Selection 
 1. Are there differences among the eight plants on the 





  “Make a single inferential statement 
concerning the means of the study’s 
populations (Huck, 2008, p. 260) 
2. Are there differences between the plants that did not 
meet safety goals and met safety goals safety outcomes in 
regard to the average of the summated Culture Values and 
Practices scores?  
a.) Are there differences between the plants that did 
and did not meet 2009 safety goals for OSHA rates 
in regard to the average of the summated Culture 
Values and Practices scores?  
b.) Are there differences between the plants that did 
and did not meet 2009 safety goals for LTA rates in 
regard to the average of the summated Culture 
Values and Practices scores?  
c.) Are there differences between the plants that did 
and did not meet safety goals for severity rates in 
regard to the average of the summated Culture 




 Two levels of the independent variable 
(achieved safety goals versus failed to 
achieve safety goals) 
3. Are there differences in the average of the summated 







 Two levels of the independent variable 





Research Questions Statistical 
Analyses 
Rationale for Statistic Selection 
4. Research Question Four: How well do the individual and 
combined Safety Culture Values and Practices score 
predict the 2009 safety outcomes by plant? 
a.) How well do the individual and combined 
Safety Culture Values and Practices score predict 
the 2009 OSHA recordable rates by plant? 
b.) How well do the individual and combined 
average of each safety Culture Values and Practices 
score predict the 2009 LTA rates by plant? 
c.) How well do the individual and combined 
Safety Culture Values and Practices score predict 




Used stepwise regression and the enter 
method as “an exploratory procedure” 
(Gliner, Morgan, and Leech, 2009) 
5. Are there differences between the plants that did not 
meet safety goals and met safety goals safety outcomes in 
regard to the average of the summated Safety culture type?  
a.) Are there differences between the plants that did 
not meet safety goals and met safety goals 2009 
OSHA rates in regard to the average of the 
summated Safety culture type?  
b.)Are there differences between the plants that did 
not meet safety goals and met safety goals 2009 
LTA rates in regard to the average of the summated 
Safety culture type?  
c.)Are there differences between the plants that did 
not meet safety goals and met safety goals 2009 
severity rates in regard to the average of the 




 More than one independent variable 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
Chapter four summarizes the analysis of the questions and responses from the 
Organizational Culture Practices and Values Questionnaire consisting of 35 items with 8 
optional demographics questions. Twenty-four questions were included in the analysis. If more 
than one response was indicated per question, the researcher randomly selected a single response 
for the analysis based on the two selections. The questionnaire items were on a scale of one to 
seven ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. If two responses were selected for 
demographics questions, then the response with the greater level of responsibility or more time 
with the company was entered into the database. If more than one work shift was provided, then 
other was selected. Blank responses were coded as 99 indicating that they were missing in the 
SPSS Statistics 18 software.  
There were only six cases where more than half of the items within a scale were left 
blank and thus excluded from analysis. The researcher explored several options in handling 
missing items for the remainder of the questions where less than half of the items in a scale were 
left blank. Regardless of whether missing items were replaced by the scale mean or excluded 
from analysis made no discernable difference in the scale scores. The results presented in this 
chapter are the average of the summated scores for each company scale. 
Research Question One 
Are there differences among the eight plants on the average of the summated safety 
culture values and practices scores? 
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Research question 1 examined whether there were differences in employee mean scores 
on the Diaz-Cabrera et al. (2007) Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices by plant. 
To answer this question, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare 
significant differences among eight plants on the five dependent variables of the safety culture 
values and practices mean scores. As noted in Table 4.1 of the safety culture values and practices 
mean scores indicated significant differences among the eight plants as follows: company values 
F(7, 1272)=26.066 , p =  < .001, leadership style  F(7, 1268)=10.317 , p < .001, motivation F(7, 
1271)=15.219, p = < .001, communication F(7,1278)=17.002, p <.001, usage of accident 






One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Summary Table Comparing 
 Plants to the Safety Culture Values and Practice Factors 
 
Source df SS MS F p 
Company Values      
Between Groups 7 228.871 32.696 26.066 < .001 
Within Groups 1272 1595.542 1.254   
Total 1279 1824.413    
Leadership Style      
Between Groups 7 135.199 19.314 20.317 < .001 
Within Groups 1268 2373.866 1.872   
Total 255 2509.085    
Motivation       
Between Groups 7 194.672 27.810 15.219 < .001 
Within Groups 1271 2322.557 1.827   
Total 1278 2517.229    
Communication      
Between 
Groups 
7 143.438 20.491 17.002 < .001 
Within 
Groups 
1278 1540.265 1.205   







One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Summary Table Comparing Plants 
to the Burke-Litwin OAS Factors 
Source df SS MS F p 
Usage of Accident Information     <.001 
Between Groups 7 162.729 23.247 18.039 < .001 
Within Groups 1281 1650.863 1.289   
Total 1288 1813.592    
 
 
Results of Games-Howell Post Hoc Multiple Comparison Test 
The homogeneity of variance Levene test indicated that the variances among the safety 
culture values and practice factors were statistically significant (p<.05). As a result, the Games-
Howell post hoc test was conducted. The calculated effect sizes (d) were reported. Table 12 
shows the means, standard deviations, and significant differences between the eight plants 
according to the mean safety culture values and practices score. The plants with the highest and 
lowest means by factor were noted. Plant 6 had significantly lower Safety culture values and 
practices scores than most of the other plants on each of the five dimensions. Plant 3 had the 
highest mean of the summated scores for leadership and communication. Plant 8 had the highest 







Means, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences Among Plants and Safety Culture Values and Practices Factors 
 Factor      
Plant #1 Plant #2 Plant #3 Plant #4  Plant #5  
n  M SD n M SD n   M SD n M SD n M SD 
Company Values  69 
5.207 
3,5,6,8 
1.171 79 5.658 
6 
1.094 304 5.999 
1,4,6,7 
1.029 182 5.227 
3,5,6,8 







1.483 78 5.378 
1,4,6 
1.043 302 5.559 
1,4,6 
1.300 185 4.760 
2,3,5 







1.405 78 4.930 3 1.538 306 5.576 
1,4,6,7 
1.307 186 4.647 
3,5,8 







1.031 78 5.756 
6 
.959 306 5.965 
1,4,6,7 
1.077 187 5.34 
3,5,6,8 
1.175 296 5.776 
1,4,6,7 
.914 




.771 79 5.399 
3,6,8 
.805 307 5.803 
1,4,6,7 
.768 189 5.187 
3,68 
.637 295 5.510 
1,3,4,6,8 
.605 
Note. Common subscripts in each row indicate significant differences between means, p <.05 using Games Howell post hoc.   









Means, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences Among Plants and Safety culture values and practices Factors 
Factor 
Plant #6  Plant #7  Plant #8  Total  





1.650 104 5.278 
3,5,6,8 
1.295 73 6.111 
1,4,5,6,7 









1.575 103 4.767 
3,5,8 
1.519 71 5.589 
1,4,6 
1.213 5.117 1.403 
Communication 74 4.735 
1,2,3,4,5,8 
1.513 103 5.218 
3,6,8
1.433 73 5.843 
1,4,8






1.599 104 5.149 
3,8 
1.186 72 5.955 
1,2,4,5,6,7 
.862 5.411 1.187 
Note. Common subscripts in each row indicate significant differences between means, p <.05 using Games Howell post hoc.   
For example, the mean shown for plant 1 is 5.207 for company values. This mean differed significantly from plants 3, 5, 6, 8 as indicated by 




Company Values. As shown in Table 12, plant 8 (M=6.111) had the highest mean scores 
in company values and plant 6 (M=4.474) had the lowest mean score based on the Likert scale of 
1 to 7. Plant 6 had a significantly lower mean score in company values than the other 7 plants. 
The effect sizes varied from small to large for the company values scores. 
Leadership Style. As shown in Table 12, plant 3 had the highest mean score for 
leadership style (M=5.559) and plant 6 had the lowest mean (M=4.525) based on the Likert scale 
of 1 to 7. Plants 7 and 8 did not have any statistically significant differences from the other 
plants. 
Motivation. As shown in Table 12, plant # 8 had the highest mean score for motivation 
(M=5.589) and plant 6 had the lowest mean (M=4.633) based on the Likert scale of 1 to 7.  
Communication. As shown in Table 12, plant # 3 had the highest mean score for 
communication (M=5.965) and plant 6 had the lowest mean (M=4.735) based on the Likert scale 
of 1 to 7.  
Usage of Accident Information. As shown in Table 12, plant # 8 had the highest mean 
(M=5.955) and plant 6 had the lowest mean score (M=4.519) for usage of accident information 
based on the Likert scale of 1 to 7. All of the plants differed significantly from # 6 (M=4.735) on 
usage of accident information scores with the exception of plants #1 and #7. All of the plants 
differed significantly from # 8 (M=5.955) except plant #3. 
 
Research Question Two 
Are there differences between the plants that did and did not meet the 2009 safety goals 





2a.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 
safety goals for OSHA rates in regard to the average of the safety summated culture values 
and practices scores?  
2b.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 
safety goals for LTA rates in regard to the average of the safety summated culture values 
and practices scores?  
2c.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve safety 
goals for severity rates in regard to the average of the summated safety culture values and 
practices scores?  
Research question two was subdivided into three questions. To answer the three research 
questions, t-tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants three safety outcomes 
and the plants’ averages for each of the five summated safety culture values and practices scores.  
The five dependent variables were company values, leadership style, motivation, 
communication, and usage of accident information scores. The independent variables included 
the plants’ OSHA, LTA, and severity rates.  
The plants were classified according to those that achieved and failed to achieve safety 
goals according to the three safety performance indicators. The dependent variables were 
normally distributed, and the Levene test indicated that the two groups met the assumption of 
equal variances. 
Table 13 shows plants that achieved and those that failed to achieve 2009 safety goals for 
OSHA recordable rates. Tables 16 and 17 indicated that LTA and severity rates did not differ 
significantly in regard to their safety culture values and practices scores. The scores and the 
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OSHA rates had small effect sizes, whereas all the scores and severity rates had large effect 







Summated Means and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices Scores by Plants That Achieved and Failed 
to Achieve 2009 OSHA Goals  
Factor 
Achieved OSHA  
Goals 
(n=4 plants) 
Failed to Achieve 
OSHA Goals 
(n=4 plants) 
    
M SD M SD t df p d 
Company 
Values 
44.184 3.037 43.223 5.658 .299 6 .775 .212 
Leadership Style 20.508 1.607 19.998 1.426 .475 6 .652 .336 
Motivation 19.871 1.690 20.315 1.844 -.355 6 .735 .251 













Summated Means and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices scores by Plants That Achieved and Failed 





Failed to Achieve 
LTA Goals 
(n=3 plants) 
    
M SD M SD t df p d 
Company 
Values 
45.125 3.369 41.333 5.157 1.281 6 .247 .871 
Leadership Style 20.541 1.394 19.774 1.658 .706 6 .507 .501 
Motivation 20.368 1.838 19.634 1.523 .578 6 .584 .435 












Means of Summated Scores and Standard Deviations of Safety Culture Values and Practices Scores by Plants That Achieved and 






Failed to Achieve 
Severity Goals 
(n=5 plants) 
    
M SD M SD t df p d  
Company 
Values 
20.610 2.455 23.067 1.617 -1.737 6 .133 1.182 
Leadership Style 19.595 1.769 20.713 1.128 -1.113 6 .308 .754  
Motivation 18.976 .703 20.733 .788 -1.958
a
 5.586
a .101 2.353  














Research Question Three 
Are there differences in the average of the summated Safety culture values and practices 
scores by geographic region? 
Research question 3 was designed to measure differences in the Safety culture values and 
practices scores between the plants in two geographic regions. To answer this research question, 
a t-test was conducted to examine the differences among the five summated scores on Safety 
culture type and geographic location. The five dependent variables were company values, 
leadership style, motivation, communication, and usage of accident information scores. The 
independent variables were the two geographic regions. 
As noted in Table 16, the four plants in the first geographic region did not differ 
significantly from the four plants in the second geographic region in terms of their average 





Means and Standard Deviations of Safety culture values and practices scores By Plants in Two Geographic Regions  
Factor 






    
M SD M SD t df p d 
Company 
Values 
21.251 3.407 22.683 1.301 -.877 6 .414 .555 
Leadership Style 19.314 1.323 20.881 1.182 -1.743 6 .132 1.249 
Motivation 19.851 2.177 20.210 1.369 -.272 6 .795 minimal








Research Question Four 
How well do the combined safety culture values and practices scores predict the 2009 
safety performance by plant? 
Sub-questions: 
a.) How well do the individual and combined safety culture values and practices scores 
predict the 2009 OSHA recordable rates by plant? 
b.) How well do the individual and combined averages of each safety culture values and 
practices scores predict the 2009 LTA rates by plant? 
c.) How well do the combined safety culture values and practices scores predict the 2009 
severity rates by plant? 
The predictor variables were company values, leadership style, motivation, 
communication, and usage of accident information. The dependent variables included OSHA, 
LTA, and severity rates. Research question four was subdivided into three research questions. 
Multiple regression was conducted using the backward and forward stepwise methods to 
determine whether the OSHA, LTA, and severity rates could be predicted from the average of 
the summated Safety culture values and practices scores. The safety culture values and practices 
scores were aggregated at the plant level, and the means, standard deviations and inter-
correlations can be found in Table 17.  The variables were entered in the following order: Usage 
of accident information, leadership style, motivation, communication, and company values were 
entered. Motivation and usage of accident information were eliminated. The final model actually 
did not include any variables. Furthermore, the combined Safety culture values and practices 

























Multiple Regression:Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for OSHA, LTA, and 















OSHA rates 9.63 6.802 .262 -.095 .214 -.143 .143 
LTA rates 2.75 2.659 -.024 -.277 -.096 -.374 -.108 












5.0718 .34749 .810*  .833* .833* .762* 
 
Motivation 
5.0249 .41171 .976** .833*  .905** .929** 
 
Comm. 









Research Question Five 
Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 
safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture type scores?  
Sub-questions: 
a.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 
2009 safety goals for OSHA rates in regard to the average of the summated 
safety culture type scores?  
b.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 
2009 safety goals for LTA rates in regard to the average of the summated 
safety culture type scores?  
c.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve 
2009 safety goals for severity rates in regard to the average of the summated 
safety culture type scores?  
Research question five was subdivided into three questions. To answer the three 
research questions, t-tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants’ three 
safety outcomes and the plants’ averages for each of the four summated safety culture 
type. The four dependent variables were supportive, innovative, policy-oriented, and 
goals-oriented culture scores. The independent variables included the plants’ OSHA, 
LTA, and severity rates. The dependent variables were normally distributed, and the 
Levene test indicated that the two groups met the assumption of equal variances. 
The three summated scores were aggregated at the plant level. There were no statistically 
significant differences between plants that achieved and failed to achieve 2009 OSHA, 
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LTA, and severity goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture type. The 
effect sizes for each of the safety culture type summated scores and OSHA rates were 
minimal with the exception of the policy-oriented culture, which was small (d=.269) 
according to Cohen (1988). Safety culture type summated scores and LTA had both 
medium and large effect sizes. All of the safety culture type summated scores and 





CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
Summary of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to identify where safety performance improvements can be 
made, thus establishing a foundation for further study by the company to formulate specific 
recommendations within the identified areas. The data were analyzed to determine whether five 
organizational practices and values described herein were predictors of 2009 safety performance. 
Accordingly, this non-experimental comparative study examined differences in safety culture 
dimensions between plants that achieved and failed to achieve their 2009 safety goals.The 
Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Kimberly, 1984) was adapted to assess safety culture 
strengths and congruencies among plants as an extension of the work of Silva, et al. (2004) and 
Diaz Cabrera et al. (2007). Additionally, the underlying values, leadership types, and culture 
orientations measured through the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices were 
tested for the first time as predictors of accident data. Despite considerable research on safety 
climate and culture predictors of accidents in organizations (Clarke, 2006), “the practical 
significance of these factors in the prevention of accidents remains undetermined” (Diaz & Diaz 
Cabrera, 1997, p. 643).  
Overview of the problem 
The research literature discussed several approaches to developing a positive safety 
culture. However, most of the research does not classify types of positive safety cultures 
according to the culture dimensions specific to both values and organizational practices. Despite 
multiple attempts to explain safety culture through competing models, there is limited empirical 
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research to substantiate which company values and organizational safety practices have the most 
demonstrative impact on safety performance at the plant level. For instance, Richter and Koch’s 
(2004) ethnographic study identified three distinct safety cultures, but these culture types were 
not statistically linked to safety performance. 
 
Instrument Modification 
The dimensions of the Safety culture values and practices questionnaire were developed 
according to research on safety climate, safety management systems, and models of 
organizational culture. Primarily stemming from the Competing Values Framework and Schein’s 
model of organizational culture, the dimensions this questionnaire are supported by relevant 
safety culture literature. Other studies have included management style as measures of safety 
climate (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007), recognizing the need to measure how managers and 
supervisors provided feedback to employees, a consideration in this study.  
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) resulted in five factors, consistent with the original 
validated instrument. As the first study applying the Questionnaire of Organizational Culture 
and Safety Practices, the results were compared with the original validation study. This study 
explained approximately 75% of the total variance of the dimensions associated with safety 
culture, whereas, the original validated instrument accounted for about 55%. The researcher 
conducted factor analysis on all of the original items on the instrument, including those that were 
eliminated from the validation study. In this study, eleven questions were eliminated and others 
reworded due to complex questions with multiple constructs and low factor loadings. 
Additionally, some eliminated items from the original instrument were included in this study 
because they were of interest to the company and they loaded well with the existing factors.  For 
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example, “My supervisor warns about possible penalties when I perform my job in an unsafe 
manner,” was included in this study, but not the original study. The Cronbach’s Alphas for each 
factor were higher in this study. The comparison table of factor loadings, Cronbach’s Alphas, 
and corrected item-total correlations are listed in Appendix I. 
 
Overview of the Findings 
Research Question One 
 Are there differences among the eight plants on the average of the summated safety 
culture values and practices scores? 
Investigation of the first research question involved conducting a One-Way ANOVA to 
analyze significant differences among the eight plants on the five dependent variables of the 
Safety culture values and practices mean scores. Table 22 and Figure 8 are a graphic 
representation of the Safety culture values and practices mean for each of the five dimensions. 
The highest and lowest means for each dimension are highlighted in Table 22.  
The significant differences among the eight plants allow the company to pinpoint some of 
the cultural variations. The company was not surprised when presented with plant 6 data. The 
company attributed the low scores of plant 6 to leadership and resources. The top performing 
plants, 3 and 8, had the highest means for the five dimensions. Plants 3 and 8 can be further 
investigated to establish benchmarks in specific practice areas related to communication, usage 





Comparison of Mean Safety Culture Scores for the Five Dimensions of the Safety Culture Values 
and Practices Questionnaire by Plant 















#1 5.207 4.811 4.719 5.438 5.104 
#2 5.658 5.378 4.930 5.757 5.399 
#3 5.999 5.559 H 5.576 5.965 H 5.803 
#4 5.227 4.760 4.647 5.341 5.187 
#5 5.749 5.271 5.340 5.778 5.510 
#6 4.474L 4.525L 4.633 L 4.735 L 4.519 L 
#7 5.278 5.103 4.767 5.218 5.149 







Figure 8. Mean safety culture values and practices scores are presented by plant according to 
company values, leadership style, motivation, communication, and usage of accident 
information. 
 
Research Question Two 
Are there differences between the plants that achieved and failed to achieve the 2009 
safety goals in regard to the average of the summated safety culture values and ractices scores? 
Research question two was subdivided into three questions. To answer the three research 
questions, t-tests were conducted to examine differences among the plants’ three safety outcomes 
and the plants’ averages for each of the five summated safety culture values and practices scores. 
Plants that achieved and failed to achieve the 2009 OSHA recordable rates, LTA, and 
severity rates did not differ significantly in terms of their safety culture values and practices 
scores. The Culture Values and Practice scores and the OSHA rates had small effect sizes, 
whereas all the scores and severity rates had large effect sizes. The scores and LTA rates had 
small, medium, and large effect sizes. 
Senior management expected significantly higher scores in leadership among the plants 
that met 2009 safety goals than those that did not. Trends were noted across the eight plants and 
the plant 3, which met the 2009 OSHA and LTA goals had the highest mean in leadership.  
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As displayed in Figure 9, Plant 3 had the highest mean for leadership style signifying that 
employees perceive that their immediate supervisors leadership style emphasized “safety goals 
achievement and safety promotion.” The leadership style dimensions were assessed through 
items on “active communication, helpful and supportive attitude, and direct involvement of the 
immediate supervisor in the resolution of safety related issues.” (Diaz-Cabrera, 2007, p. 10). 
 
 
Figure 9.  The mean scores for leadership style are presented by plant. 
One of the unique aspects of the instrument employed in the study was the assessment of 
company values. Guldenmund’s (2007) evaluation of safety culture research from 1980 to 2003 
recognized the emphasis on employees’ attitudes towards safety, and acknowledged the paucity 
of research on determining whether organizations value safety. Further, Guldenmund (2007) 
recognized the inability to capture safety values through self-administered questionnaires thus 
far. Applying the Competing Values Framework to safety culture research, eight questions were 
developed and analyzed in attempted to measure company values.  
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The results of the company values scores are presented below in Figure 9. Plant 6 scored 
significantly lower than each of the other plants.  It was noted that the two plants 3 and 6 that had 
the highest scores for leadership also had the highest scores for company values. 
 
 
Figure 9.  The mean scores for company values are presented by plant. 
 
Research Question Three 
Are there differences in the average of the summated safety culture values and practices 
scores by geographic region? 
Research question three was designed to measure differences in the Safety culture values 
and practices scores between the plants in two geographic regions to study the culture 
congruency among the plants. To answer this research question, a t-test was conducted to 
examine the differences among the five summated scores on Safety culture type and geographic 
location. The five dependent variables were company values, leadership style, motivation, 
communication, and usage of accident information scores. The independent variables were the 
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two geographic regions. As noted in Table 16 in the results section, plants in the first geographic 
region did not differ significantly from the plants in the second geographic region regarding the 
average of their summated safety culture company values and practices scores.  
 
Research Question Four 
How well do the individual and combined safety culture values and practices scores 
predict 2009 safety performance by plant? 
The predictor variables were company values, leadership style, motivation, 
communication, and usage of accident information. The dependent variables included OSHA, 
LTA, and severity rates. Research question four was subdivided into three research questions. 
Multiple regression was conducted using the backward and forward stepwise methods to 
determine whether the OSHA, LTA, and severity rates could be predicted from the average of 
the summated Safety culture values and practices scores. The scores did not have significant 
positive relationship with safety outcomes. The final model actually did not include any 
variables. Furthermore, the scores from the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
did not predict 2009 OSHA, LTA, and severity rates in this company. 
 
Research Question Five 
Are there differences between the plants that did and did not meet 2009 safety goals in 





a.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and did not achieve 2009 
safety goals for OSHA rates in regard to the average of the summated safety 
culture type?  
b.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and did not achieve 2009 
safety goals for LTA rates in regard to the average of the summated safety culture 
type?  
c.) Are there differences between the plants that achieved and did not achieve 2009 
safety goals for severity rates in regard to the average of the summated safety 
culture type?  
Statistically non-significant differences existed between plants that achieved and did 
not achieve 2009 OSHA, LTA, and severity goals in regard to the average of the 
summated safety culture type. The effect sizes for each of the Safety culture type 
summated scores and OSHA rates were minimal with the exception of the policy-oriented 
culture. 
Conclusion 
This was a non-experimental study conducted in a single organization; therefore, the 
results cannot be generalized to other companies. As an extension of safety climate instruments, 
the Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices was intended to assess the core 
dimensions of safety culture at the individual, department and plant levels. Examining safety 
from a culture perspective presents more of a holistic perspective of the safety management 
system than from only a climate perspective. It does so to “encourage the participation of 
organizational members in risk prevention and to influence members’ initiatives and behaviors as 
a group” (Díaz-Cabrera, 2007, p.1202). 
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The results of the questionnaire were investigated to determine if the classification of 
safety culture values and practices scores could differentiate safety performance outcomes at the 
plant level. The safety culture type failed to serve as differentiators in terms of outcomes, but 
nevertheless provided some insightful information into the “shared views” (Grote & Künzler, 
2000, p. 147) and differences about dimensions of safety culture among plants. After all, this 
questionnaire was intended to reflect employees’ judgment of which aspects of the safety culture 
contribute to the achievement of safety goals (Grote, 2000).  
Neither safety culture type scores nor safety culture values and practices scores were 
predictors of 2009 OSHA, LTA, or severity rates. The descriptive statistics showed that 51% of 
those that responded to question one indicated they agree or strongly agree that only serious 
incidents and accidents are reported. If not all incidents and accidents are reported, then it is not 
possible to compare culture dimensions and to predict outcomes. This offers a possible 
explanation as to why the safety culture values and practices scores were not predictors of safety 
outcomes. There are additional latent variables which may include employee turnover, training, 
and financial resources. 
Analyses of Effect Sizes 
Both p values and effect sizes were carefully considered in interpreting the statistical 
results in combination with the study design and adherence to statistical assumptions. 
Significance values were reported for both significant and non-significant relationships, and 
statistical significance was indicated at the .05 levels. Cohen’s d was reported as the indicator of 
practical significance representing “the strength of the relationship” (Gliner & Morgan, 2009). 
Thompson also asserted that calculated p values are not useful indices of study effects. 
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Therefore, the results of the t-tests and ANOVAs lacking statistical significance in this study 
were not discounted.  
The t-test results indicated large effects on a) company values, b) communication, and c) 
usage of accident information between the four plants that achieved and failed to achieve either 
2009 LTA or severity goals, despite non-significant results. One possible explanation for the 
large effect sizes in this study due to the 1,291 survey participants within the eight plants. 
According to Sigfried, “A large sample can detect statistically significant differences for a small 
effect (Siegfried, 2010, p. 27). Therefore, it is not known whether the large effect sizes are 
meaningful. Thompson (1998) outlined variables to consider in weighing statistical versus 
practical significance. One factor was the reliability of the constructs. The reliability of the 
constructs in this study was high and Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .839 to .940. As Thompson 
(2007) recommended, the study design should be taken into account when investigating effect 
sizes. Since this study was limited to 8 plants in a single organization, further research is needed 
to test the effect sizes among other organizations in multiple industries. 
This study did not suggest that a “strong culture is associated with fewer accidents or less 
severe accidents” as the study by Silva et al., (2004) revealed. Silva et al. studied the relationship 
among organizational climate and safety climate to develop validated measures of both 
constructs based on the Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). In addition, 
they examined differences among the newly established safety climate dimensions and low and 
high accident and severity rates in 1999. Strong correlations existed between safety practices 
such as, “safety as an organizational value and learning from accidents” and the corresponding 
accident frequency and severity rates. Furthermore, the effect sizes, ranging from .36 to .92, 
suggested the “capacity to predict and distinguish organizations with different accident levels,” 
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(p.217) which was the purpose of this study. The effect sizes in this study for company values 
and usage of accident information were .212 and minimal for OSHA rates, but were .871 and 
.969 respectively for LTA. The effect sizes were even larger for severity as 1.182 and 1.286. 
The following recommendations were offered to address issues that surfaced from Silva’s 
(2004) survey results: a) testing these survey items in a larger sample to determine the predictive 
nature of the safety climate factors, and b) analyzing “the specific relationship between climate 
and culture” p. (218). Silva et al. recommended incorporating items of safety culture in 
combination with safety climate to predict safety outcomes. The instrument in this study 
incorporated safety climate items adapted from the instrument of Silva et al. in addition to 
validated measures of safety culture. However, employee perceptions of items related to safety 
practices were not predictive of either accident or severity rates in this study. 
Although this study was not limited exclusively to climate factors, dimensions such as 
motivation and leadership style from this study are reflective of climate. The lack of statistical 
significance between leadership style and safety data did not directly coincide with Clarke’s 
(2006) meta-analysis of 35 studies on positive safety climate and positive safety performance. 
Neither did it support other studies have shown that a positive safety climate contributes to lower 
accident rates (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Both motivation and communication had small effect sizes 
and had non-significant relationships with 2009 OSHA and LTA. Nevertheless, motivation, 
communication, and severity rates had large effect sizes. Motivation and severity had an effect 







Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
This study was exploratory and as such, the next step should involve an examination of 
the instrument’s factor structure through a confirmatory factor analysis. The findings from this 
study suggest the importance of investigating differences in accident rates among plants in this 
undisclosed company. The primary strength of this study was that the performance outcomes 
were based on objective data. The limitations of the study included: a.) a small n of eight plants 
and b.) lack of control over work shifts, employee tenure, training, and incentives. The 
researcher recognized that employees may not report all incidents. Further research is needed to 
explore the relationship between the safety culture dimensions in this study that were related to 
accident rates in other studies (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007; Grote, 2008; Grote & Künzler, 
2000; Silva et al., 2004; Varonen & Markku, 2002; Vredenburgh, 2002). More specifically, all 
five of the safety culture dimensions and severity rates had large effect sizes with both leadership 
style and communication exceeding one. 
An inherent limitation of survey research is the inability to probe for more information 
based on the responses. Certainly, it is easier to observe behaviors than to measure values and 
beliefs. Further research should include qualitative data based on structured interviews and focus 
groups. For instance, the communication questions asked about the types of communication and 
frequency of communication, but did not evaluate the quality of communication. It is not known 
whether the supervisors discussing safety are purely giving lip service or whether their practices 






Recommendations for Practice 
Clearly, there were latent variables that could not be explained in this study. As Diaz-
Cabrera et al. (2007) speculated the instrument might not capture safety culture in its entirety 
given the many aspects of safety culture. Additionally, it is difficult to measure culture 
dimensions, such as organizational values exclusively through a questionnaire. According to 
Grote (2000), there is an issue of “determining shared as well as conflicting norms within and 
between groups in an organization and the relationship between norms and safe performance” 
(p.135).  
Plant 6 was an anomaly as it was significantly lower on company values from each of the 
other seven plants, but it met the 2009 safety goals for OSHA and severity. Plant 6 should be 
examined closely to determine why it was the only plant that scored lower on each of the five 
dimensions. Additional data should be analyzed and compared with the other 7 plants. For 
example, annual audit scores might be compared across plants to pinpoint specific practices that 
could be improved based on observation and survey scores. Continued emphasis should be place 
on reporting all accidents from minor first aids and up given that only half of the 1,291 
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Appendix D  
Literature Review Method 
 
Initially, I began a broad search using the following keywords ("safety culture*" OR 
"safety climate*" OR "safety behavior*" OR "safety attitude*" OR "safety intervention*)” string 
in Digital Dissertations and in the Engineering Compendex database, limited to the United 
States, published in English, 1999-2009. The 343 results were then limited to manufacturing. A 
search within the Safety Sciences and Risk database from 1994-2009 using the following 
keywords yielded 34 results: a.) Organizational culture and safety and manufacturing, b.) Safety 
culture or safety climate and construction, c.) Organizational culture and outcomes, * and d.) 
Organizational culture and accidents and manufacturing industry.* Articles on audits and a 
culture of safety and changing the culture of safety management were incorporated into the 
review. Non-peer reviewed journal articles were eliminated. 
A search of the Health and Safety Science Abstracts database with the keywords “safety 
culture” yielded 197 results and a search in the Business Source Premier database yielded 415 
results on “safety culture.” Additional keywords were added to limit results as follows: “safety 
culture and safety performance indicators,” which yield three results in Business Source Premier 
and nine result in the Engineering Compendex. Further, I located 29 meta analyses using the 
terms “meta analysis and safety culture” in Science Direct. A search in Digital Dissertations on 
“safety and days away restricted transfer” rates yielded three dissertations. Two journal articles 
were located using the terms “injury prediction” and “safety culture” in Science Direct. 
Seventeen articles were located related to safety management in Business Source Premier 
using the search terms “safety management and values.” An Ebsco Source Premier search of 
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multiple databases including Academic Search Premier; Business Source Premier; EconLit; 
Newspaper Source; PsycINFO; Business Source Elite yielded 41 results. Three articles were 





Literature Review Search Strings 
 
Variable/Keyword Specify how the search was conducted 
i.e. title, subject terms, author & 
Other search criteria, peer reviewed 
journals, PDF 
# of hits Database Categorized as “yes” or 
“maybe” 
 An search of multiple databases 
including: Academic Search 
Premier;Business Source 
Premier;EconLit;Newspaper 
Source;PsycINFO;Business Source Elite 
41 Ebsco Source Premier 1.) 12 
Variable: organizational 




1.) organizational culture 
and safety and 
manufacturing 
2.) safety culture and U.S. 
manufacturing 
3.) organizational culture 
and outcomes* 
4.) organizational culture 
and accidents and 
manufacturing industry* 
 






1.) 7 peer reviewed 
journal articles; 7 books 
 
 
2.) 8 peer reviewed 
journal articles 
 
3.) 5 peer reviewed 
journals: 5 conferences; 1 
book 
 




Sciences and Risk 
2.) Safety 
Sciences and Risk 
3.) Safety 
Sciences and Risk 
4.) Safety 
















1.) Safety culture 
 
1994-2009 1.) 133 peer reviewed 
journals; 19 conferences; 
7 books 







1.) "safety culture*" OR 
"safety climate*" OR 
"safety behavior*" OR 
"safety behavior*" OR 
"safety attitude*" OR 
"safety intervention*" 
2.) "safety culture*" OR 
"safety climate*" OR 
"safety behavior*" OR 
"safety behavior*" OR 
"safety attitude*" 
1.) 1999-2009 
2.) United States, published in English, 
1999-2009; journal article 
 
1.)187 results 
2.) 343 results 
 















based safety, safety 
management system, and 
socio-technical systems 
and safety 
1.) behavior based 
safety and manufacturing 
2.) accidents and 
socio technical systems 
3.) safety 
interventions and workers 
compensation claims 
all publication types; Subject terms; 
1994-2009 
 
1.) 1 peer reviewed 
journal article; 1 book 
2.) 6 peer reviewed 
journals 
3.) 3 peer reviewed 
journals 
1.) Safety Sciences and 
Risk 
2.) Health and Safety 
Sciences 








Interventions (types of) 
 
Keywords: occupational 
safety and intervention 
and manufacturing 
 
1.) occupational safety and 
intervention and 
manufacturing 
2.) behavior based safety 
and United States and 
manufacturing 
3.) socio technical system* 
and manufacturing* 
4.) occupational health or 
occupational exposure or 




Boolean phrase; Peer reviewed journal; 
search within the full text of the articles; 
within Subject terms; 1994-2009 
1.) 10 peer reviewed 
journal articles 
2.) 3 peer reviewed 
journal articles 
3.) 32 peer reviewed 
journal articles 
4.) 43 peer reviewed 
journal articles 
1.) Ebscohost and 
Business Source Premier 
2.) Ebscohost, Business 
Source Premier, and 
Psychinfo 
3.) Ebscohost, Business 
Source Premier, 
Psychinfo, Econlit, and 
Academic Search Premier 
4.) Ebscohost, Business 
Source Premier, 
Psychinfo, Econlit, and 












1.) occupational health or 
occupational exposure or 
occupational safety or 
intervention or “plywood” 
or “paper industry” 
1999-2009; English only 1.) 105 peer reviewed 
journal articles; 16 
conferences; 2 books 
Health and Safety Science 
Abstracts 
1.) 3 
Variable: DART rates 
 
Keywords: 
1. Days Away Restricted 
Transfer 





 1.    
Variable: Injury 
prediction and safety 
culture 
1. Injury prediction and 
safety culture 
2. “Injury prediction” and 
“safety culture” 
 1.) 4,275 articles 
2.) 2 




  Science Direct  
Variable: safety culture 
and safety outcomes 
 1. ) 9 Engineering Compendex 1. ) 2 
Meta-analysis and safety 
culture 
 1. ) 29 Science Direct  
Zohar 2002 safety 
climate 















Alteration of Consent: Dissertation Instrument Cover Letter 
 
Questionnaire of Safety culture values and practices 
Dear Participant, 
 
I am a researcher at Colorado State University in the College of Applied Human Sciences.  I am 
conducting a research project as part of my doctoral dissertation on safety culture at . T j;. The 
Principal Investigator (PI) for this project is my advisor, Alina Waite, Ph.D., School of 
Education, and the Co-PI is Gene Gloeckner, Ph.D., School of Education. The title of our project 
is “Assessing Safety Culture, Values, Practices, and Outcomes.” 
   
We are asking you to participate in our research project by taking the Questionnaire of Safety 
Culture and Values. In the following pages, there are some questions about different aspects of 
safety at a kj;kj; grouped by topics.  Please indicate on the scale of 1 to 7 whether you agree or 
disagree with each question related to your company.  There are no right or wrong answers.  
Your participation in this research is voluntary.  Your confidentiality will be maintained 
throughout the research project and individual responses will not be released to the company.  
At the end of the survey, some information about your job is requested and optional.  If you 
decide to participate in the questionnaire, you may withdraw your consent and stop participation 
at any time with no consequences. 
 
Our intent is to gain more knowledge on values and practices related to safety culture at  kj;kj;.  
All data will be analyzed and scored then summarized for your organization in a final report. 
Please do not write your name on the survey.  Your participation will be confidential to ensure 
the researchers and your employer will not be able to connect your name to your perceptions. A 
designated proctor will administer the questionnaire and then collect the questionnaires in an 
envelope, which will be sealed to maintain total anonymity. Completed surveys will be sent to 
Colorado State for analysis. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, 
neither you nor your company will be identified in these written materials.  It is not possible to 
identify all potential risks in research procedures, but we have taken reasonable safeguards to 
minimize any known and potential, but unknown, risks. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact Evie Chenhall at 970-492-9240 or 706-207-6323. If 
you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact Janell Barker, 
Human Research Administrator, Colorado State University, at 970-491-1655. 
 
Thank you so much for your participation. 
Sincerely, 
 
Evie Chenhall    Alina Waite, Ph.D.  Gene Gloeckner, Ph.D. 
Ph.D.Doctoral Student   Assistant Professor   Associate ProfessorApplied 
Human Sciences   School of Education   School of Education 
evie@chas.colostate.edu    alina.waite@colostate.edu  Gene.gloeckner@colostate.edu 
970-492-9240    970-491-5029   970-491-7661 





Questionnaire of Safety Culture Values and Practices 
 
INCIDENT AND ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 
1=Strongly Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
1. My co-workers and I report only serious incidents and accidents, not the less serious incidents and 
accidents. 
2. My co-workers and I report incidents and accidents, even if it interferes with achieving work goals. 
3. My co-workers and I participate in the development of new work procedures. 
4. I feel that this company values employee compliance with safety policies and procedures. 
5. I feel that this company values the honesty of all employees in collecting information about 
incidents and accidents. 
6. I feel that this company values all employees’ ability to work together to identify solutions to 
problems in my work area. 
7. I feel that this company values all employees’ initiative in identifying new solutions to improve 
safety. 
8. I feel that, at this company, the results of incident and accident investigation are used to develop 
changes in work procedures based on employee solutions to improve safety.  
9. I feel that, at this company, the results of incident investigations are used to revise work goals.  
10. I feel that, at this company, the results of incident investigations are used to provide information 
to employees about the consequences of breaking safety policies and procedures. 
11. I feel that, at this company, the results of incident and accident investigations are used to identify 
training needs and training program development. 
SAFETY STANDARDARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES                                 1=Strongly 
Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
12. I feel that, at this company, safety policies are flexible and will be changed, as necessary, to make 
work practices safer for employees. 
13. I feel that, at this company, working conditions will be changed when employees make 
suggestions to improve safety (when possible).  
14. I feel that, at this company, standard operating procedures and safety policies determine how I 
perform my job. 
15. I feel that, at this company, standard operating procedures and safety policies are general 
guidelines because productivity goals have priority over health & safety goals. 
SAFE BEHAVIOR PROMOTION                                                                        1=Strongly 
Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
16. I feel that this company values the contributions of employees who promote health & safety. 
17. I feel that this company values employees that follow safety policies and procedures to promote 
safety.   
18. I feel that this company values new and creative suggestions from employees to improve safety. 
19. I feel that this company values employees’ achievement of both productivity and safety goals.  
COMMUNICATION                                                                                               1=Strongly 
Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
20. At this company, the managers and employees communicate regularly about issues related to safe 
working conditions. 
21. At this company, managers usually communicate the safety goals to employees. 
22. At this company, there is usually formal communication of safety policies and procedures that 
employees are to follow. 




LEADERSHIP SAFE BEHAVIOR                                                                        
1=Strongly Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
24. My immediate supervisor shows me the safe way to perform my job duties when I act in an 
unsafe manner. 
25. When I perform my job in an unsafe manner, my immediate supervisor analyzes the unsafe 
behavior to determine the cause. 
26. When I perform my job in an unsafe manner, my immediate supervisor corrects me and reminds 
me about possible penalties. 
27. When I act in an unsafe manner, my immediate supervisor discusses with me the most 
appropriate solution to prevent the unsafe behavior in the future. 
 
JOB SATISFACTION                                                                                       
1=Strongly Disagree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
28. My department encourages teamwork and cooperation between employees and managers. 
29. My department cares about employees’ job satisfaction. 
30. My department provides clear performance expectations through explaining policies and 
procedures. 
31. My department provides well-defined goals that are specific, achievable, and realistic. 
32. My work goals are specific, achievable, and realistic. 
33. I have variety in my job duties. 
34. I am satisfied with the cooperation between employees and managers in my work group. 







COMPANY/JOB INFORMATION (Note: The Company does not have access to 
individual responses) 
 




2. Please indicate the one that best describes your level of responsibility on your 
scantron sheet. 
  
(1) a kj;kj; Division 1 hourly employee 
(2) a kj;kj; Division 1 supervisor 
(3) a kj;kj; Division 2 hourly employee 
(4) a kj;kj; Division 2 supervisor        
(5) a kj;kj; Division 3 hourly employee 
(6) a kj;kj; Division 3 supervisor  
(7) a kj;kj; Division 4 hourly employee  
(8) a kj;kj; Division 4 supervisor 
(9) Other  
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (Optional) 
3. Service with the company:  4. Time in current position: 
(1) Less than 1 year (1) Less than 1 year 
(2) 1 to 2 years (2) 1 to 2 years 
(3) 3 to 5 years (3) 3 to 5 years 
(4) 6 to 10 years (4) 6 to 10 years 
(5) 11 to 15 years (5) 11 to 15 years 
(6) 16 to 20 years (6) 16 to 20 years 
(7) 21 years or more (7) 21 years or more 
 
5. How many hours do you typically work in a normal shift? 
8 hrs____ 10 hrs____ 12 hrs____ Other_____ 
 
6. Which shift do you typically work? 



























Factor 1: Company Values 
(34.51%) 
 0.91  
Factor 1: Company Values 
(20.021%) 
 0.940  
(Q5) Values rules fulfillment 0.70  0.72 
(Q4) Values employee compliance 
with safety policies and procedures 
0.743  0.766 
(Q6) Values sincerity and 
participation 
0.68  0.73 
(Q5) Values honesty of all 
employees in collecting info about 
incidents and accidents 
0.779  0.785 
(Q7) Values collaboration in 
goals achievement 
0.59  0.74 
(Q6) Values collaboration in goals 
achievement 
0.751  0.795 
(Q8) Values the initiative in 
finding new solutions to 
improve safety 
0.40  0.70 
(Q7) Values initiative in indentifying 
new solutions to improve safety 
0.732  0.790 
(Q17)Values participation in 
safety promotion 
0.52  0.65 
(Q16)Values participation in safety 
promotion 
0.543  0.772 
(Q18) Values rules observation 
to promote safety 
0.48  0.64 
(Q17) Values employees that follow 
safety policies and procedures to 
promote safety 





















(Q19) Values the contribution 
of creative ideas to improve 
safety 
0.48  0.73 
(Q18) Values the contribution of 
creative ideas to improve safety 
0.539  0.813 
(Q20) Values goals 
achievement 
0.63  0.71 (Q19) Values goals achievement 0.496  0.779 
        
Factor 2: Leadership Styles 
(7.71%) 
 0.91  
Factor 2: Leadership Styles 
(16.233%) 
 0.934  
(Q29)Encourages creativity, 
faces up to challenges 
0.67  0.72 
 Eliminated Encourages creativity, 
faces up to challenges due to 
complex nature of question with 
multiple constructs 
   
(Q30) Defines, plans, 
coordinates aims; motivates 
subordinates to achieve aims; 
acknowledges achievement 
0.76  0.77 
Eliminated Defines, plans, 
coordinates aims; motivates 
subordinates to achieve aims; 
acknowledges achievement due to 
complex nature of question with 
multiple constructs 
   
(Q31)  Organizes, coordinates, 
and controls 
0.83  0.79 
Eliminated organizes, coordinates, 
and controls due to complex nature 
of question with multiple constructs 
   
(Q32) Promotes cohesion, 
listens, communicates, and 
helps 
0.74  0.76 
Eliminated promotes cohesions, 
listens, communicates, and helps due 
to complex nature of question with 
multiple constructs 





















(Q33) Shows the safe way to do 
the task 
0.75  0.74 
(Q24) Shows the safe way to perform 
my job duties  
0.764  0.793 
(Q34) Analyzes the root cause 
of the unsafe behavior 
0.62  0.67 
(Q25) Analyzes unsafe behavior to 
determine the cause 
0.831  0.880 
(Q35) Eliminated Warns about 
possible penalties when I 
perform my job in an unsafe 
manner 
   
(Q26) Warns about possible penalties 
when I perform my job in an unsafe 
manner 
0.833  0.853 
(Q36) Offers solutions for 
unsafe behavior 
0.72   
(Q27) Discusses most appropriate 
solution to prevent unsafe behavior 
0.809  0.853 
        
Factor 3: Motivation Patterns 
(4.99%) 
 0.92  
Factor 3: Motivation Patterns 
(15.221%) 
 0.911  
(Q37) Department cares about 
satisfaction with the work team, 
for example: cooperation 
between employees and 
managers 
-0.93  0.82 
(Q28) Department encourages 
teamwork and cooperation between 
employees and managers 
0.671  0.770 
(Q38)  Department cares about 
employees' job satisfaction 
-0.92  0.83 
(Q29) Department cares about 
employees' job satisfaction 





















(Q39)  Department cares about 
satisfaction with performance 
criteria, for example: clarity of 
policies and procedures 
-0.88  0.84 
(Q30) Department provides clear 
performance expectations through 
explaining policies and procedures 
0.707  0.810 
(Q40)  Department cares about 
satisfaction with work goals, 
for example: goals are well-
defined 
-0.79  0.78 
(Q31) Department provides well-
defined goals 
0.763  0.800 
Factor 4: Training Programs 
(4.46%) 
 0.86  
Training Program Factor: Eliminated 
due to complex nature of questions 
and multiple constructs 
   
(Q45) Human Resources 
training courses such as: 
leadership and working in 
groups; quality of work life; 
interpersonal communication 
   
Eliminated Human Resources 
training due to complex nature of 
questions with multiple constructs 
   
(Q46) Innovation/change 
training such as: creativity; 
group problem-solving; 
management and development 
   
Eliminated Innovation/change 
training due to complex nature of 
question with multiple constructs 
   
(Q47) Technical and 
professional training such as: 
use of tools and equipment; 
safety rules; norms and 
procedures 
   
Eliminated Technical and 
professional training due to complex 
nature of question with multiple 
constructs 





















(Q48) Goal setting and goal 
achievement training such as: 
cost-risk optimization; task and 
procedure planning; time 
management 
   
Eliminated Goal-achievement 
training due to complex nature of 
question with multiple constructs 
   
Factor Eliminated: (3.86%)    Factor Eliminated    
(Q2) Eliminated Information 
about accidents from 
experience in their work 
context 
   
(Q2) Eliminated Information about 
accidents from experience in their 
work context; did not fit well with 
any factor; construct not clear 
   
(Q3) Eliminated Information 
about accidents that interfere 
with achieving goals 
   
(Q3) Eliminated Information about 
accidents that interfere with 
achieving goals; did not fit well with 
any factor; construct not clear 
   
Factor 5: Downward 
Communication (3.47%) 
 0.80  
Factor 4: Communication 
(14.329%) 
 0.884  
(Q25) Communication among 
employees and supervisors 
about safety 
0.62  0.65 
(Q20) Communication among 
employees and supervisors about 
safety 
0.666  0.750 
(Q26) Communication of safety 
goals 
0.64  0.64 
(Q21) Communication of safety 
goals 





















(Q27) Formal communication 
of safety policies and 
procedures 
0.68  0.65 
(Q22) Formal communication of 
safety policies and procedures 
0.740  0.700 
(Q23) Item not listed on 
author's factor analysis) 
   
(Q23) Usually communication 
among employees to identify 
solutions to improve safety 
0.692  0.670 
(Q15) Safety rules and 
procedures are obligatory 
criteria 
0.42  0.48 (Q15) Eliminated     
(Q18) Values observation of 
safety rules and procedures  
0.45  0.58 (Q18) Eliminated    
Factor 7: Safety Promotion 
Eliminated 
       
(Q23)  Safe performance 
obtains promotion and 
economic incentives 
   
Eliminated Safe performance obtains 
promotion and economic incentives 
Eliminated 
   
(Q24) Safe performance gains 
social recognition 
   
Eliminated Safe performance gains 
social recognition Eliminated 
   
(Q15) Safety policies and 
procedures are obligatory 
criteria 
   
Eliminated Safety policies and 
procedures are obligatory criteria  



























Factor 6: Usage of Accident 
Information (3.04%) 
 0.82  
Factor 5: Usage of Accident 
Information (9.627%) 
 0.839  
(Q9)  Change development -0.51  0.63 
(Q8) Changes in work procedures 
based on employee solutions to 
improve safety 
0.447  0.740 
(Q10) Revision of work goals -0.62  0.72 (Q9) Revision of work goals 0.731  0.630 
(Q11) Information about non-
observance of policies (rules) 
and sanctions 
-0.8  0.58 
(Q10) Information about 
consequences of  breaking safety 
policies and procedures 
0.799  0.530 
(Q12) Identification of training 
needs 
-0.62  0.66 (Q11) Identification of training needs 0.546  0.700 
        
Factor 9: Safety Promotion II 
Eliminated (2.70%) 
   
Factor 9: Safety Promotion II 
Eliminated 
   
(Q21) A safe worker avoids 
penalization  
   
Eliminated A safe worker avoids 
penalization  
   
(Q22) A safe worker gains 
autonomy and responsibility 
   
Eliminated A safe worker gains 
autonomy and responsibility 
   
(Q23) The immediate 
supervisor warns about possible 
sanctions 
   
(Q26)Moved to leadership factor 2: 
The immediate supervisor warns 
about possible penalties 
   
 
